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Abstract 
 
The recent deterioration of the strong bilateral alliance between Israel and Turkey has 
significant affects on the balance of power within the Middle East. As such, it is 
important that scholars determine why this meltdown has occurred. This thesis sought 
to explain the deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey and overcome gaps 
in the existing literature concerned with this meltdown of bilateral relations by taking 
a fresh look into the role of identity and the interests it creates. Hence, the framework 
of Wendtian constructivism was applied in order to examine the social origins and 
impacts of identity and interests on alliance formation and deterioration. In this thesis, 
I suggested that Israel’s identity has changed slowly over the past decade and as such, 
should be perceived as ‘relatively’ stable. Conversely, however, Turkey’s national 
identity changed sharply, drifting away from the Ataturk agenda of Westernisation 
and secularism towards an Islamic heritage. In order to strengthen my argument that 
this shift in Turkish identity has primarily accounted for the deterioration of its 
relations with Israel, I analysed Turkish attitudes towards foreign policies other than 
its bilateral relationship with Israel, as well as its newly defined interests. Thus, 
whereas Israel’s relatively stable national identity and domestic policies were 
matched by its relatively stable foreign interests over the past decade, deep changes to 
Turkey’s national identity redirected its domestic policies under Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan’s government. Consequently, Turkey has employed a number of political 
tensions and events as pretexts in order to unilaterally disengage from its relations 
with Israel so that it can further new foreign policies and interests. Identity matters, 
and for better or worse, identity changes precede foreign policy change, a lesson we 
must not forget. 
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Introduction: The Meltdown 
 
 
srael and Turkey share the commonality of being both democratic and non-Arab 
states situated in the Middle Eastern region of Arab dominated countries. 
Dissimilarly though, Israel and Turkey do not identify themselves through common 
religious affiliations. That is, 75.3% of Israel’s population self-identify as being 
Jewish, whilst 99.8% of Turkey’s population currently identify themselves as 
Muslims (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2012a and; Central Intelligence Agency 
2012a). Despite this cultural disparity, both states have enjoyed a relatively strong 
diplomatic, military and economic partnership since 1949. This alliance has 
encompassed various land, sea, air and intelligence agreements as well as an 
economic trade boom in the 21st Century, reaching a peak trade market of $4.4 billion 
in 2011 (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2012b). However, since 2011 tensions 
have mounted to the point that a significant deterioration of relations between Israel 
and Turkey has occurred.  
 
Since the 2002 inception of Turkey’s Justice and Development (Adalet ve 
Kalkinma, AK) Party under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, relations 
between Israel and Turkey have increasingly deteriorated. This deterioration in 
relations was made official by a series of immediate responses to the polemical Mavi 
Marmara flotilla incident of May 2010. The responses included the immediate 
freezing of 16 defense contracts and training exercises such as the ‘Anatolian Eagle’ 
in 2010, followed by the subsequent and mutual withdrawal of diplomats in 2011. The 
significance of this bilateral relationship is crucial given the volatile nature of the 
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region, as it contributes to maintaining a distribution of power within the international 
arena. This paper adopts a social means of inquiry into the identity and interests of 
each of these states, respectively, in order to better understand this breakdown in 
relations. In order to do this, the dependent variables of identity and interests will be 
tested in the case of each state so as to identify any change in these over the past 
decade. The results will then be used to demonstrate why this recent meltdown in 
relations between Israel and Turkey has occurred. To borrow the words of Wendt, 
“Power and interests are important factors in international life, but since their effects 
are a function of culturally constituted ideas the latter should be our starting point” 
(1999: 41). This examination will provide an understanding of Turkey’s role in 
unilaterally disengaging from its relations with Israel, which I argue is the result of a 
change in Turkey’s national identity and state interests. 
 
TURNING POINTS 
In March 1949, Turkey became the first state within the region of the Middle East to 
formerly recognise the state of Israel. This initiated a bilateral relationship between 
Israel and Turkey, which allowed for and encouraged cooperation when it came to 
concerns of regional instabilities. For instance, in August 1958, then Israeli Prime 
Minister David Ben-Gurion and Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes established 
a partnership, known as the “Peripheral Pact”, which outlined joint public relations 
ventures and an exchange of intelligence data (Nachmani 1987: 75). Whilst Israel and 
Turkey have disagreed in the past over the issue of Palestine, particularly with regards 
to Israel’s gains from the Six-Day War in 1967, the bilateral partnership remained 
resilient during this period, assured by Turkey’s abstention from joining the Arab 
initiated reference to Israel as an “aggressor state” (Dahl and Slutzky 2006: 1). 
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Furthermore, at the 1969 Organisation of the Islamic Conference held in Morocco, 
Turkey again opposed calls to relinquish diplomatic relations with Israel (Dahl and 
Slutzky 2006: 1).   
 
 Although during the 1980s relations experienced a period of tension, the 
extent of the pressures don’t compare to the diplomatic stagnation of present. Rather, 
after Yasser Arafat opened the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Ankara 
during October 1979, Turkey downgraded its diplomatic ties with Israel to a level of 
second secretary in December 1980, a change that was upheld on a reciprocal basis by 
Israel (Roberson 1998: 168). Turkey claimed the cause for this change was Israel’s 
unconciliatory policy towards Middle Eastern issues, specifically, the issue of 
Palestine (Dahl and Slutzky 2006: 1). Notwithstanding these symbolic changes 
however, each state maintained a presence of charge d’affaires in the other, and by 
1988 relations had warmed up again. This claim is supported by the Turkish decision 
to deny diplomatic status to PLO representatives in Ankara throughout 1988 in 
response to Israeli demands (Burris 2003). A full restoration of ambassadorial 
relations between Israel and Turkey were returned by December 1991 (Inbar 2010: 
28). This restoration was reinstated by the signing of new principles for cooperation 
between the two states’ defense ministries in April 1992 and by the establishment of 
the Turkish-Israeli Business Council in March 1993 (Dahl and Slutzky 2006: 2-3). 
Relations remained relatively stable throughout the rest of this decade, and a free 
trade agreement was reached in March 1996, to take effect from May 1997 (Republic 
of Turkey Ministry of Economy 2012).  
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Militarily, ties also remained strong through the turn of the century with 
Israel’s signing of a $75 million contract to upgrade forty-eight Turkish F-5 aircrafts 
in 1998 worth $900 million. This military collaboration was extended to include the 
upgrading of 170 Turkish M60A1 tanks at a cost of $687, Turkey’s purchase of 
Popeye-11 surface-to-air missiles worth $150 million, and 10 Israeli Heron unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAV) costing Turkey another $183 million (Nachmani 1998 and Katz 
2011). In addition to these sales, agreements were made for the exchange of pilots 
eight times per year and Israel granted permission for Turkish pilots to train at Israel’s 
computerised firing range at the Nevatim airfield (Nachmani 1998). Other joint 
military exercises included the Reliant Mermaid III, IV and V, which took place from 
early 2001 to December 2002 (and Dahl and Slutzky 2006: 6-7). These agreements 
indicate not only strong diplomatic connections, but also too the strength of military 
and economic relations between Israel and Turkey during the early 2000s. However, 
as a result of the meltdown in relations between these two states, all military 
agreements between Israel and Turkey have remained suspended since September of 
2011.  
 
A PARTY OF PROBLEMS 
With the inception of turkey’s AK party in 2002, relations between Israel and Turkey 
have been somewhat hostile due to the change in Turkish national identity. I will 
argue that a number of events such as, but not limited to, the cancellation of various 
joint military exercises including Operations Cast Lead and Anatolian Eagle; the Gaza 
war and; the Flotilla incident of 2010 are pretexts used by Turkey in order to redirect 
its foreign interests and furthermore, that scholars, such as Brayer, Cowell and the 
international media in general, have unwisely attributed too much causal power to 
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these events (Brayer 2010; Cowell 2011; Keinon 2012). Nonetheless, these events, 
and others, have resulted in the suspension of diplomatic and military collaborations 
such as Turkey’s previously stated freezing of 16 defense contracts with Israel 
(Friedman and Fraser 2011). Notwithstanding this, what makes this recent 
deterioration of bilateral relations different to past tensions is that they are not 
explicitly identified by either state as being reactionary to the Palestine problem 
alone, which has historically been at the heart of tensions between these two states. 
Instead, the demise in relations has occurred at the culmination of various events, 
which will be discussed in Chapter Two of this paper and be referred to as ‘pretexts’ 
arguably used by Turkey in order to unilaterally disengage from its relations with 
Israel. 
 
ARGUMENT IN BRIEF 
This paper examines the national identity and state interests of Israel and Turkey, 
respectively, over the past decade. Israel’s identity is tested by means of examining 
domestic policies in order to demonstrate that its national identity has remained 
‘relatively’ stable, where relative stability infers a slow pace of change under 
interchanging governments, but no sharp changes to its national identity. 
Contrastingly, an analysis of Turkey’s identity indicates that deep changes to 
domestic policies have resulted in a sharp redefinition of Turkey’s national identity. 
To demonstrate that this change in identity was not just reflected in Turkey’s relations 
with Israel, I examined two case studies as testing mechanisms of Israel and Turkey’s 
foreign policies and interests, respectively. These findings indicated that Israel’s 
foreign policies and national interests have remained relatively stable over the past 
decade, like its national identity. However, the examination of Turkey’s foreign 
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policies indicated that like its national identity, Turkey’s interests had been sharply 
redirected under the current AKP government. Thus, because of this redirection of its 
interests, Turkey has unilaterally disengaged from its relations with Israel, using a 
series of political tensions and events as pretexts.  
 
AVAILABLE ANSWERS 
Since Turkey became the first Middle Eastern state to recognise the state of Israel in 
1949, the relationship between these two states strengthened so much so that many 
scholars described it as a “strategic alliance” (Kosebalaban 2010 and; Oguzlu 2010). 
However, since the AKP gained electoral success within the Turkish parliament in 
November 2002, relations between these two states have suffered. Whilst there has 
been an abundance of literature on the relationship between Israel and Turkey in years 
gone by, the contemporary nature of the sudden deterioration of relations at late 2011 
has somewhat limited the quantity of published academic sources, often rendering one 
to rely heavily on the media’s portrayal of events. Nonetheless, when assessing what 
sources we do have, there is much conjecture over the causation of the breakdown in 
relations, although three main arguments emerge.  
 
The first approach to this topic largely attributes the cause of the breakdown to 
be concerned with the historic problems associated with Palestine and other events 
that have shaped change. Scholars of this argument, particularly Brayer and Cowell, 
attribute the ultimate cause in the downgrade of relations to the 2010 event of the 
Mavi Marmara flotilla raid, which they argue occurred at the culmination of other 
tensions such as the Gaza War of 2008-2009 and political tensions pertaining to the 
December 2009 television scandal of “The Separation” episode aired in 2010 (Brayer 
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2010; Cowell 2011 and; Inbar 2011). The international media has contributed to this 
line of thought, particularly after the findings of the United Nations (UN) inquiry into 
the blockade of the flotilla from entering Gaza, chaired by Geoffrey Palmer and 
released in September 2011. The report indicated that actions taken by Israel in the 
incident were done so within the boundaries of international law and for the purposes 
of national interest and security, however, it did also identify that Israel had used a 
“disproportionate” measure of force and “an unacceptable level of brutality” through 
the use of smoke grenades and rounds fired from helicopters (Palmer et al 2011: 4). 
Notwithstanding this though, the report also questioned the motives of the flotilla, 
stating it raised, “serious questions about the conduct, true nature and objectives of 
the flotilla organisers, particularly the IHH” 1 (Palmer et al 2011: 4). According to 
Time magazine, Turkish Prime Minster, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s reaction to the 
Palmer report’s findings led to the recall of Turkey’s ambassador to Israel and the 
cancellation of various joint military exercises in addition to ordering Israel’s 
ambassador, Gabby Levy, to leave Turkey by Wednesday 7 September 2011 (Vick 
2011). Conversely to this view though, this paper seeks to explore a means of inquiry 
other than the notion of event driven change.  
 
Second, are the realist and hegemonic explanations that are concerned with the 
changes in the balance of power based upon notion of Turkey’s plight to emerge as 
hegemon of the Middle Eastern region. Scholars such as Ogurlu and Candar have 
argued this theory substantially and make many points concerning Turkey’s 
realignment of power with its Middle Eastern neighbours including Iran and Egypt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 IHH: İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı, is a Turkish based non-
governmental, humanitarian relief foundation pronounced in English as The 
Foundation for Human Rights, Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief  
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(Ogurlu 2012: 5, 11, 13 and Candar 2009: 8-10). However, this theory is contingent 
upon the Arab Spring and its contribution to Turkey’s emergence as a regional 
hegemon. What is more, this theory of inquiry does not provide an adequate variable 
testing mechanism for which we can isolate the relations between Israel and Turkey 
specifically. 
 
The third debate, with which this essay extends upon, is that of a social 
inquiry into the role of identity and interests in alliance formation and deterioration. 
This theory, focused on identity and interests, provides a deeper argument that 
acknowledges the contribution of events and changes to the balance of power, but 
asserts that these have occurred as the result of changes in identity. Accordingly, 
scholars from this field have agued that a change in Turkey’s identity has occurred, 
thus indicating that its interests potentially no longer align with Israel’s (Dincer and 
Karal 2011 and; Johansson-Nogués and Jonasson 2011). However, the paucity of 
socially constructed arguments of identity and interests and their contribution to the 
recent deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey has resulted in gaps in the 
literature. This is particularly concerning due to the volatile nature of the region and 
the significant implications that a breakdown in relations between these two states 
could have on the balance of power within not only this region, but the greater 
international arena as well.  
 
A NEW APPROACH 
Starting from constructivist assumptions, this paper bridges gaps in the literature by 
examining the role played by identity and interests in the recent meltdown in relations 
between Israel and Turkey. The lens of Wendtian constructivism is applied in order to 
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theoretically explain and link between changes in national identity and changed state 
interests. It will be offered that this change in identity, viewed as a turning point in 
Turkish politics under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s tenure from 2002, has been the 
leading cause of the deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey. Hereafter, 
the role of this paper will therefore be to address this recent breakdown in relations 
between Israel and Turkey from a social means of inquiry so as to articulate a better 
understanding of why the breakdown has occurred. As such, the aim of this research 
paper is not to assess the causal aspects of how the breakdown has occurred; rather, 
the focus is on providing an understanding of why it has occurred. For this reason, it 
is logical that a constructivist approach be taken in order to examine the question. The 
justification for this will be outlined in Chapter One. 
 
ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an understanding of why there has been a 
recent change in the bilateral relations between Israel and Turkey. In order to do so, 
Chapter One will be concerned with providing the theoretical framework of the 
constructivist lens through which this essay is structured. This chapter will address the 
specific reasoning behind utilising Wendtian constructivism, which then provides the 
means for which claims can be substantiated when arguing that changes in identity are 
intertwined with changes in interests. As Wendt terms it, “identities are the basis of 
interests” (1992: 398). This theoretical positioning of the paper will then allow for an 
understanding of the logical order this paper proceeds in.  
 
Both Chapter Two and Chapter Three apply the Wendtian constructivist 
framework, outlined in Chapter One, to the states of Israel and Turkey, respectively, 
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in order to examine the social change and possible changes in identity to provide an 
understanding of whether such a change has occurred or not. Chapter Two applies 
testing mechanisms in order to assess the social construction of Israel’s identity by 
examining domestic policies. Two two case studies are then applied in order to test 
the continuity of Israel’s national interests over this past decade and to indicate 
whether the relative stability of its national identity is reflected by the state’s foreign 
policies and interests. The two case studies employed are Israel’s relations with the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Israel’s relations with the US. This examination 
demonstrates that over the past decade, Israel has not endured a significant change in 
its state interests. For this reason, it is justifiable to assume that Israel’s foreign 
policies towards Turkey remained constant, given the relative stability of its domestic 
and foreign interests. These findings will indicate that the deterioration of relations 
between Israel and Turkey might therefore be reflective of some change to Turkey’s 
identity and interests.  
 
Chapter Three assesses the Turkish account for the breakdown in relations. In 
this chapter I apply the theoretical framework of Wendtian constructivism again in 
order to understand the construction of contemporary Turkish identity. I demonstrate 
that Turkey has undergone a deep change in its national identity under the sharp 
redirection of domestic policies under the current AKP government, which has in turn 
redefined Turkey’s state interests thereby resulting in a changed attitude towards 
Turkey’s relations with Israel.  
 
The final segment of this thesis highlights the findings of this research. Firstly, 
that Israel’s identity, and therefore interests, remained relatively stable over the past 
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decade, whereas the sharp change in Turkey’s national identity has resulted in deep 
changes to Turkey’s interests. This change has resulted in Turkey’s national interests 
no longer aligning with those of Israel’s. Thus, for this reason, Turkey has less reason 
to cooperate with Israel and vice versa because their interests are experiencing a 
period of misalignment. The implications of this are identified as having the potential 
to have significant consequences in the balance of power both within the region and 
within the international arena. It is hoped that through an understanding of why this 
breakdown in relations has occurred, readers can better understand the affects of 
identities and interests to alliances within the international arena.  
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Chapter One:  
A Social Inquiry 
 
 
his thesis argues that we can better understand the meltdown in relations 
between Israel and Turkey by taking the Wendtian constructivist approach of 
examining their respective national identities and state interests. However, before 
testing these dependent variables, it is important to understand the purpose of doing 
so. As such, this chapter examines why Wendtian constructivism is the best 
theoretical explanation for why relations between Israel and Turkey have deteriorated 
recently. In doing so, it is established that a change in national identity can result in a 
change of state interests, which in this case led to the deterioration of relations 
between Israel and Turkey.  
 
The discipline of International Relations (IR), since its inception post World 
War I, has been consumed by the study of the causes of war with the stated aim of 
which to explain how states can avoid such conflicts into the future (Dickinson 1917: 
v). However, with the emergence of the Cold War in 1947 it became apparent that 
preexisting schools of IR were inadequate in explaining some conflicts, such as the 
Cold War, which continued as an unresolved conflict until 1991. In response, scholars 
emerged with new theories of IR such as poststructuralism, critical theory, feminism 
and constructivism, each of which explore both causal and non-causal aspects of IR, 
challenging the mainstream ‘positivist’ methods of preexisting theories.  
 
 
T 
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Robert Keohane has described these newly emerged theories as ‘reflectivist’, a 
notion referring to their rejection of purely scientific approaches, instead proposing 
methods of social enquiry (1988: 384). In this way, the defining difference between 
these pre and post Cold War schools of thought are their plight to either explain IR 
through causal analysis or to understand IR by means of inquiry into the reasons for 
events (Hollis and Smith 1990: 3). With the emergence of these new approaches to 
political science, aspects of inter-state affairs, not limited to conflict, have become of 
interest. For example, scholars have sought to understand and determine the causes of 
democracy, globalisation, terrorism and global inequalities (Kurki 2008: 1). However, 
what this paper is concerned with understanding are the reasons for the downgrade in 
bilateral relations between Israel and Turkey. 
 
DEFINING IDENTITY 
The concept of identity comes from social psychology and refers to “the images of 
individuality and distinctiveness ‘selfhood’ held and projected by an actor and formed 
(and modified over time) through relations with significant ‘others’” (Jepperson, 
Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 21). In other words, identity refers to the mutually 
constructed and evolving image of self and other. Accordingly, Hopf asserts that the 
first core assumption of identity formation is its reliance upon social construction 
(Hopf 2002: 2). This social construction comes about by the influences of both 
international and domestic environments (Wendt 1987 and Neumann 1992).  
 
Identity functions as the connecting link between environmental structures and 
interests. As such, the notion of a ‘national identity’ is formed out of the construction 
of community boundaries based upon shared language, socially meaningful cultural 
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symbols and imagery or ‘frames’, and national history of the nation’s formation 
(Shafique 2011).  For the purposes of this thesis, religion is the focal form of identity 
construction within the states of Israel and Turkey. This form of national identity will 
be demonstrated as contributing significantly to the interests and foreign policies of 
each state respectively. The second core assumption relevant to identity is that of 
relational comparisons. This dictates identities are incomplete without an 
understanding of one’s self in relation to others (Barnett 1999: 9). That is, there is 
always an internal-external dynamic to identity formation in that collective identities 
do not just emerge from internal group processes (Shafique 2011). Lastly, is the 
assumption that identities are not natural, fixed or stable entities (Shafique 2011). 
This is because, according to Katzenstein, identities both generate and shape interests 
(Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 21). In this way we can better understand 
bilateral relationships between states as the perception of one’s self-identity in 
relation to the perceived identity of another, and what common interests these states 
might share which draw them closer together. Thus, relating back to the case studies 
within this thesis, I argue that the socially constructed identity of Israel and the 
changes to that of Turkey’s has resulted in the deterioration of relations between these 
two states. 
 
UNPICKING WENDT  
When enquiring into the nature of relations between Israel and Turkey, the concern is 
founded upon understanding the tensions between this historically strong bilateral 
alliance. In this way, this paper is a non-causal form of inquiry which challenges the 
dominant 20th Century discourse of neorealism by allowing for non-causal 
contributing factors (Hollis and Smith 1990: 3). These are used to show that structure 
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is given meaning by states according to their socially derived understandings. In the 
words of Alexander Wendt, “Identities are the basis of interests” (1992: 398). 
Accordingly, interests presuppose identities because, according to Wendt, an actor 
cannot know what it wants before it knows who it is (1999: 231). In this way, the 
ontological concern of constructivism is the social construction of the social world 
(Guzzini 2000: 174). For this reason, the significance of the Wendtian approach is in 
its emphasis on justifying empirical studies that may then be used to understand 
events as opposed to explaining their causation. As Colin Wight has synthesised, 
“Conceptual inquiry is a necessary prerequisite to empirical research” (Wight 2006: 
290). Moreover, in conjunction with Wendt and Jepperson, Katzenstein argues that 
agency and environment are mutually constitutive (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 
1996: 11).  
 
For the previously stated reasons, Wendtian constructivism is the best 
theoretical approach to take in order to understand the deterioration of relations 
between Israel and Turkey. Similar cases studies have also employed this theoretical 
framework in order to better understand changes in state interests. For example, 
Dingding examined the recent change in China’s foreign policy and argues that this 
came about as a result of China’s redefined identity as a ‘modern socialist’ state and 
its increased connection with the international human rights community (Dingding 
2009: 339). Likewise, Shafique took a constructivist approach in order to understand 
the enduring conflict between India and Pakistan, concluding that the relationship can 
only be understood by examining each state’s identity as shaping its interests 
(Shafique 2011).  
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DECONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVISM  
It is important to highlight and recognise any limitations of constructivism in order to 
challenge these criticisms. Scholars, such as Kurki, have challenged that 
constructivism does not conceptualise causation beyond the assumptions of 
Humeanism2 which can result in “reductionist tendencies” (2008: 125). Additionally, 
Kurki posits that constructivists make claims that appear causal, however cannot be 
so, due to the Humean conception of what ‘causal’ means (2008: 125). In order to 
overcome these perceived flaws of constructivism, this paper will employ Alexander 
Wendt’s school of constructivism, specifically, so as to understand the current 
downturn in relations between Israel and Turkey. In doing so, a conscious 
acknowledgment of these perceived flaws to constructivism are refuted for the 
following reasons. Firstly, the claim that constructivism does not conceptualise 
causation beyond the Humean sense is not the concern faced by constructivists, 
rather, it is in ascertaining that international relations are socially constructed and 
“imbued with social values, norms and assumptions” (Fierke: 2007: 168). Secondly, 
Wendtian constructivism, by definition, does not seek to obtain the causal explanation 
for an event, as has been previously highlighted. Therefore, the claim by Kurki that 
infers constructivism makes causal claims yet they cannot be termed causal because 
of the Humean conception of this term is inconsequential to scholars of 
constructivism. This is because the focus of constructivism is on the social 
construction of understanding events and as such it accepts the Humean assumptions 
regarding causation. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Here, Humeanism refers to the work of David Hume (1711-1776), a Scottish 
philosopher known for his work on empiricism and skepticism. 
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Notwithstanding this, it is equally significant to highlight the role of 
constructivism in addressing the inadequacies of Kenneth Waltz’ neorealism, which 
established itself as a formal theory of IR throughout the persistent Cold War. 
Constructivism contests the neorealist assumption that state egoism in anarchy begets 
self-help (Waltz 1979 and; Mercer 1995: 229). Furthermore, constructivism posits 
that structures of international relations are social, not material as neorealism offers, 
and that these structures shape actors’ identities and interests (Bozdaglioglu 2003: 3). 
Hence, if we accept these constructivist statements as true, then we cannot use any 
theory of realism since it necessarily dictates that states are identical, which prevents 
the social analysis of individual states (Hopf: 1998). Katzenstein supported this notion 
when he claimed that “cultural environments affect not only the incentives for 
different kinds of state behaviour but also the basic character of state ‘identity’” 
(Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 8). Katzenstein juxtaposes this theoretical 
assumption with that of neorealists and neoliberals alike who argue that “the defining 
actor properties are intrinsic to state, that is, ‘essential’ to actors (rather than socially 
contingent), and exogenous to the environment” (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 
1996: 8). Thus, the theories of neoliberalism and neorealism are not compatible with 
theories of constructivism and as such, prevailing assumptions of the former must be 
replaced by a social analysis of identity and interests. 
 
AGENCY AND STRUCTURE 
Kenneth Waltz’ theory on international politics prescribes that “a system is composed 
of a structure and of interacting units,” where it is assumed that states are the units 
within this decentralised and hierarchical international system (1986: 70). In this 
scenario, the actions of these units compose the structure, with anarchy as the 
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ordering principle (Palan 2000: 576). Thus, stemming from this notion evolves the 
concept of ‘self-help’ as the ordering principle of action within this anarchic system 
of states (Waltz 1979: 62). However, the application of the concept of self-help 
necessarily entails a measurement of the material capabilities of one state to perform 
tasks, relative to another state. Whilst neorealism dictates that instances of 
cooperation or conflict which occur within this system of self-help are the result of 
rational calculations of costs and benefits by each state respectively, constructivist 
thought asserts, conversely, that situations of cooperation or conflict depend on the 
social identities of the relevant actors (Waltz 1979: 95). In other words, 
constructivism debates “the extent to which state action is influenced by ‘structure’ 
(anarchy and the distribution of power) versus ‘process’ (interaction and learning) and 
institutions” (Wendt 1992: 391).  
 
Thus, the essence of the constructivist argument is that structures of 
international relations are social and not material. For this reason, the process by 
which the interests and identities of actors are shaped by structure is referred to as 
their ‘socialisation’ (Bozdaglioglu 2007: 130). That is, meaningful behaviour can only 
be achieved by agents (states) through an understanding of global norms (structures) 
and practices which produce an intersubjective social context (Bozdaglioglu 2003: 
16).  Additionally, norms provide agents with understandings of their interests which 
are, it is argued by Wendt, shaped by institutions such as sovereignty (1992: 413). To 
breakdown this concept, Wendtian constructivism argues that the actions of agents are 
meaningless without the social context of the norms and practices that have shaped 
that choice of action. This understanding of a ‘social context’ prescribes that actors 
perceive situations differently, depending on their respective intersubjective 
	   19	  
understandings and practices (Hopf 1998). For this reason, concepts such as 
cooperation might have varying meanings to various actors, thus shaping their 
decision to act in a certain way, as Digure 1, below, illustrates, where State A might 
be applied in order to represent Israel and State B, as Turkey, for the purpose of this 
research paper.   
Diagram 1: Wendt’s codetermination of institutions and processes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                       
Source: Wendt (1992): 406 
 
In this way, it is evident that the social construction of events as interpreted by each 
state, respectively, influence both State A’s interests, and in turn, the interests of State 
B. 
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SOCIAL STRUCTURES 
Henceforth, having established that social contexts are pertinent to demonstrating how 
the identity of states justifies particular state interests, the term ‘social structure’ must 
be defined. According to constructivist reasoning, social structure within the context 
of international relations is composed of three interrelated facets including, shared 
knowledge, material resources and practices (Wendt 1995: 73). In this way, 
Bozdaglioglu infers that material resources only acquire meaning for human action 
through the shared knowledge in which they are embedded (2003: 17).  
 
Accordingly, states act in certain ways towards different actors, depending on 
the understanding they have of their material capabilities. That is, a state will act 
differently towards states it perceives as an enemy as opposed to a state it perceives as 
a friend, even if the latter has greater material capabilities than the former. Thus, 
according to Wendt, the neorealist doctrine lacks the ability to predict state behaviour 
and “does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes (or) will recognise 
each other’s sovereignty…these factors, which are fundamentally intersubjective, 
affect states’ security interests and thus the character of their interaction under 
anarchy” (1992: 396). Walt, in his revision of Waltz’ theory, acknowledges this 
limitation of neorealism, arguing that the balance of threats, not the balance of power 
is what determines state actions, whereby threats are socially constructed (Walt 1987). 
Therefore, unlike neorealism, which isolates the causal role of power by holding 
interests and identities constant, constructivism applies a social examination in order 
to show how structures influence the way actors define themselves (Copeland 2000). 
This then provides an understanding for why actors act in certain ways within the 
international system, that is, in cooperation or anarchy.  
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the principles of constructivism and argued why Wendtian 
constructivism is the most suitable theoretical framework to apply in order to 
understand why the change in bilateral relations between Israel and Turkey has 
occurred. With an understanding that identity is formed by both international and 
domestic sources of influence it was argued that identity is not stable and can be 
altered by social constructions that then result in changes to state interests. This 
framework provides the structure for which the following two chapters will proceed 
by testing the continuity of Israel and Turkey’s identities, respectively, in order to 
determine whether a change in identity might have occurred, resulting in changed 
state interests and thus the meltdown in relations between these two states.  
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Chapter Two:  
An examination of Israel’s Identity and Interests  
 
 
hrough an understanding of identity based state interests, this chapter will now 
examine the role played by Israel’s national identity and state interests in 
contributing to the deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey. Israel is a 
non-Arabic, democratic State of Jewish majority located in the region of the Middle 
Eastern. It is a small state sized roughly 22,070 square kilometers, surrounded by its 
counterparts of Arabic states, often of Islamic identity (Nation Master 2012a). As 
such, Israel can be described as a small state representing a minority within its region, 
indicative of its relatively meager population of seven and a half million compared to 
that of its neighbouring Egyptian population of eighty-two million and Syria’s 
twenty-two million population (Nation Master 2012a). Since the declaration of Israel 
as a state independent from the British mandate of Palestine in 1948, Israel has 
experienced conflict with many of its neighbouring states, including Egypt, Lebanon, 
Syria and Jordan who have at various times sought to emancipate the pre-1948 
Palestinian occupants of Israel by denouncing the state of Israel (Brenner and Frisch 
2003: 184).  
 
After three decades of war and conflict, peace treaties with both Egypt and 
Jordan were reached and signed in 1979 and 1994, respectively. However, uncertainty 
remains with regards to peace along Israel’s remaining borders as the Israeli-Palestine 
conflict remains unresolved. For this reason, the state of Israel has incessantly been 
challenged by the dilemma of how to maintain the Jewish national identity of the 
majority, despite its regional placement as a minority amongst its neighbouring 
T 
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Arabic and Islamic states who have historically denied the legitimacy of Zionism and 
the state of Israel. So what is the significance of this to Israel’s deteriorated foreign 
relations with Turkey?  
 
In this chapter, I argue that Israel’s identity has remained relatively stable over 
the past decade, the common stance of previous Israeli governments having been a 
focus on the security and stability of Israel as a Jewish state. Having established this, 
the second part to this chapter will focus on determining the continuity of Israel’s 
foreign interests over the past decade. After proving that both Israel’s identity and 
interests have remained relatively stable over the past decade, this will then go 
towards giving credibility to the third and final section of this chapter which argues 
that Turkey has unilaterally disengaged from its relations with Israel using a series of 
pretexts. Henceforth, through the application of the social constructivist means of 
inquiry, this chapter will argue that both Israel’s identity and interests have remained 
relatively constant, calling on the need for inquiry to be made into that of Turkey in 
the next chapter. 
 
In order to get to this point, this chapter will establish that Israel’s Jewish 
national identity refers to a combination of both religiosity and nationality. This will 
then allow for an examination of the continuity of this national identification over the 
past decade. Having established that the first dependent variable of Israel’s identity 
proves reasonably constant, the dependent variable of Israel’s state interests will be 
tested by means of two case studies. The purpose of applying two case studies in 
addition to the study of Israel’s relations with Turkey is to demonstrate that the 
deterioration of this bilateral relationship is not representative of a change in Israel’s 
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foreign policy altogether, but of a change in the international environment. Moreover, 
by examining case studies other than Israel’s relations with Turkey, it will be 
demonstrated that Israel’s foreign policy has remained relatively stable.  
 
The first case study will examine Israel’s policies towards the Palestinian 
occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the second will examine 
Israel’s foreign relations with the United States over the past decade. These case 
studies will provide the testing mechanisms with which to prove that Israel’s state 
interests, like its national identity, have remained relatively constant over the past 
decade. This will demonstrate that the theory of Wendtian constructivism holds true 
in this case, insomuch as it dictates that identity and interests are inextricably linked 
therefore any change in state interests would have been presupposed by a change in 
national identity. To again borrow the words of Wendt, “identities are the basis of 
interests” (1992: 398).  Lastly, the final component of this chapter will analyse a 
series of political tensions and events leading up to the recent deterioration of 
relations between Israel and Turkey. This will then provide the means for which the 
following chapter will proceed by arguing how we can better understand this 
deterioration of relations through an examination of Turkey’s shifting national 
identity and state interests. 
 
ISLAM AND THE JEWISH STATE OF ISRAEL 
Since the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel in 1948, Israel has fought to 
maintain its existence as a sovereign state with many of its Islamist neighbours, such 
as Palestine and Iran, who have refused to recognise the Jewish state of Israel. Iran 
has furthered this refusal with frequent threats alluding to its nuclear ability to “wipe 
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Israel off the face of the earth” (Torbati 2012 and Indyk 2012). Moreover, in the 
ensuing war of Israel’s establishment, the Palestinian inhabitants of the nascent state 
largely either fled Israel or were expelled as refugees to the occupied territories of the 
West Bank and Gaza strip or other neighbouring states such as Jordan (“Identity 
Crisis: Israel and its Arab citizens 2004: 7). The state of Israel then encouraged the 
immigration of Jews from around the world, so long as ‘Jewishness’ could be proven, 
in order to increase Jewish citizenry of Israel (“Identity Crisis: Israel and its Arab 
citizens” 2004: 34). However, the dilemma for Israel persists. How does the Jewish 
state of Israel endure its existence within a region that predominantly identifies itself 
as being either Arab or Islamist, especially when a large proportion of the non-Jewish 
Israeli population identify with Islam?  
 
This has become of particular significance since the recent uprising of the 
Arab Spring, which has brought increased uncertainty for Israel within the already 
volatile region of the Middle East (Indyk 2012). Since the Arab Spring, Israel’s 
strategic posture within the region has come under question. The 2011 Egyptian 
revolution, which led to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood forging stronger ties to 
Palestine’s Hamas3, increased uncertainty regarding the continuation of the Israel-
Egypt peace treaty of 1979 (Black 2011). Despite the continued commitment to the 
treaty by newly elected Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi in June 2012, increased 
terrorist activity in the Sinai Peninsula, particularly the border attack of 5 August 
2012, poses problems for the future of this peace treaty (Blomfield 2012). In addition 
to this border attack, there have been 15 other bombings along this peninsula targeting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Hamas refers by acronym to the Palestinian Harakat al-Muqāwamah  
al-’Islāmiyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement) political party of Islamist ideologies.	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gas pipelines since the 2011 Egyptian revolution and subsequent inception of the 
Muslim Brotherhood (Harb 2012).  
 
Israeli sanguinity in its peace treaty with Jordan has also become the subject of 
question since the strengthening of ties between Jordan and Hamas. In 2011, King 
Abdullah II was quoted when directing a speech to Palestine’s Hamas leader, stating, 
“Jordan will continue to support you politically and economically during the next 
stage until reaching the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on 
Palestinian national soil” (Kahn 2011). This comment symbolises a significant 
turning point in relations between Jordan and the Palestinians given the historic 
tensions after King Hussein’s slaughter of Palestinians challenging his sovereignty in 
September of 1971. This strengthening of ties between Jordan and Hamas has resulted 
in Israel’s more cautious approach to relations with Jordan. In this way it is evident 
that Israel’s security as both a state and in its Jewish identity is an ongoing plight, 
which perhaps consequently, has resulted in Israel’s development of arguably the 
strongest and most technologically advanced military force in the Middle East (Indyk 
2012).  The necessity of this military force is evident given Israel’s constant battle to 
secure its national identity, which will be defined under the following section which 
tests this dependent variable of Israel’s Jewish identity.  
 
DEFINITIONAL DILEMMAS  
Having thus far established that Israel seeks to validate its identity as a Jewish state 
located within a region dominated by volatile Islamic states such as Iran, Egypt, Syria 
and the Palestinian entities of Gaza and the West Bank, it is essential that this chapter 
define specifically what is meant by reference to ‘Jewish’ identity. Additionally, this 
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chapter will demonstrate through data analysis, that Israel’s occupancy is comprised 
of predominantly Jewish identifying citizens. Although the Zionist movement initially 
sought to limit the term ‘Jewish’ to a reference of territorial-political nationality, it 
was unsuccessful and the term is commonly used at present to reference both one’s 
national and religious affiliations (Abramov 1976: 323). I argue later in this chapter 
that this extension of the meaning of Jewishness has enabled Israel to establish a 
stronger connection to the US and its some six million populates who identify 
themselves as being Jewish, if only by religious affiliation (DellaPergola 2010: 16). 
 
ISRAEL’S JEWISH IDENTITY 
Complexities have arisen to who classifies as a Jew, that is, the differentiation of 
Jewish nationality from religious affiliations and ethnicity. Accordingly, the criteria 
of being a ‘Jewish’ citizen lies in one’s ability to prove firstly, the extent of their 
religiosity and secondly, their residency and identification with the secular national 
concept of political membership (Glenn and Sokoloff 2010:34). In this way, Jewish 
citizenship relies on both objective, transnational criteria as well as more local, 
subjective criteria (Glenn and Sokoloff 2010:35). Thus, in contemporary times, 
‘Jewishness’ can be surmised as being a complex identity, encompassing both one’s 
religious affiliations with Judaism, as well as one’s nationality, presuming this 
individual fulfills the criteria of an Israeli citizen.  
 
Discourse pertaining to Israeli citizenship consists of three superimposed 
layers according to Peled. An ethno-nationalist discourse of inclusion and exclusion, a 
republican discourse of community goals and civic virtue, and a liberal discourse of 
civil, political and social rights (Peled 2007: 335). The first layer, with which this 
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chapter is concerned with, distinguishes Israel’s Jewish citizens from its Palestinian 
non-citizens, suggesting that the national identity of Israel, according to citizenship 
rights, is Jewish. Thus, the purpose of this section is to establish that the majority of 
Israel’s population identify themselves as being Jewish. You might then ask, but what 
is the significance of Israel’s identity to the deterioration of foreign relations between 
Israel and Turkey in recent years? By demonstrating the Israel’s domestic policies 
have remained relatively constant thereby resulting a slow pace of change and relative 
stability in the state’s national identity, it suggests that Israel’s interests should have 
remained relatively stable as well.  
 
In 1950, the ‘Law of Return’ was legislated into Israeli law, dictating that all 
Jews have the right to return and settle in Israel, and obtain citizenship (AICE 2012). 
The purpose of this law was to further the Zionist movement and to increase Israel’s 
Jewish citizenry. Of significance to this chapter, are the eligibility requirements of 
Jewish citizenship, outlined by this Law. The Law of Return initially stipulated, in 
accordance with the Halakha4, that a person is ‘Jewish’ if his or her mother is Jewish, 
or if they convert to Judaism (AICE 2012). In 1970 this criteria was amended to 
include the children and grandchildren of a Jew, and the spouses of the children or 
grandchildren of a Jew (AICE 2012). Limitations to the Law of Return outlined that 
those who were previously a Jew but who voluntarily changed their religion could not 
re-seek Jewish citizenship (AICE 2012). As such, the following data has been collated 
in accordance with these stipulations. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The Halakha is the collective body of religious and biblical laws for Jews 
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The following data has been triangulated in order to provide a mean for the 
percentile of Israel’s Jewish occupation both prior to this current decade and at 
present, to demonstrate that the identity of Israel has remained relatively constant over 
the past decade. The following Figure 2.1 illustrates the percentage of Israel’s citizens 
from 1997-1999 who are Jewish in identity as accounting for nearly 80% of the total 
population.  
 
Figure 2.1: Percentage of Israel’s population nominally Jewish 1997-1999 
 
Source:  AICE (1999); ICBS (1999) and; CIA (1999) 
This figure is compared purposefully to that of 2012 figures in order to 
demonstrate that within this period of scope almost 80% of Israel’s population have 
continued to identify themselves as being Jewish. Figure 2.2 below, demonstrates that 
similarly to Figure 2.1, approximately 76% of Israel’s population identified 
themselves as being Jewish. 
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Figure 2.2: Percentage of Israel’s population nominally Jewish 2012 
 
Source: CIA (2012a); ICBS (2012c); Nation Master (2012b) 
 
Although there is a slight decline in the figures represented from Figure 2.1 compared 
to Figure 2.2, this has been accounted for by the overall decline in the birth rate of 
Jewish citizens within Israel from 1999 to 2012. Statistics indicate that this disparity 
in growth rates is reflected by a Jewish population growth rate of 1.7% in the 1990s 
compared to the 2.6% growth rate of the Arab population in Israel, of whom account 
for roughly 20.5% of Israel’s total population (CBS 2009). However, it should be 
acknowledged that there seems to be a recent upturn in the trends of Jewish growth 
rates, calculated to have increased by 0.2% to 1.9% in 2010 (CBS 2011). 
Interestingly, Guttman Institute polls carried out in 1993, indicated that of Israel’s 
Jewish population, only 13% were religiously unobservant (Elazar 1993). Thus, it was 
demonstrated that, through the use of data, there has been a continuity of Israel’s self 
identification as being Jewish both a decade ago and at present.  
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ISRAEL’S WESTERN ORIGINS 
Unlike other states within this region, with the establishment of the Jewish state of 
Israel in 1948 came an influx of peoples from Europe who identified themselves as 
being Jewish and as such, sought to settle in the newly established Jewish state of 
Israel. Within the first decade of Israel’s establishment, 936,082 immigrants were 
recorded as having arrived the European states of Germany, Austria, Italy, and British 
settlers from Cyprus (MFA 1998 and; Kaplan 2012). At this time, this accounted for 
nearly half of the total population of Israel, which at 1958 stood at 2,032,000 (MFA 
1998). This data indicates that the cultural heritage of a large proportion of Israel’s 
current population has stemmed from European roots. Moreover, whilst it was 
established above that almost 80% of Israel’s population identify themselves as being 
Jewish, this figure equates to approximately 5,687,250 individuals which is in fact 
less than the estimated 6,039,600 individuals [as of 2012] who identify themselves as 
being Jewish citizens residing within the US (DellaPergola 2010: 16). This 
foreshadows the strong connection between Israel and the US which is discussed 
below. 
 
In 1992, then Presidential candidate Bill Clinton reiterated Israel’s connection 
to the US and, inadvertently the West, when he stated, “our relationship would never 
vary from its allegiance to the shared values, the shared religious heritage, the shared 
democratic politics which have made the relationship between the United States and 
Israel a special- even on occasion a wonderful- relationship” (US House of Congress 
1994: 118). This contributes to linking Israel and the US and further goes towards 
proving the claim of Israel’s strong connection to the West through both the European 
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heritage of almost half of the population at its establishment as well as through the 
large number of Jews living within the US.   
 
DOMESTIC POLICIES  
Israel, unlike many of its theocratic neighbours within its Middle Eastern region, is a 
parliamentary democracy. In 2007 Shimon Peres was elected as President of Israel 
and in 2009 Benjamin Netanyahu achieved electoral success and became Prime 
Minister. Netanyahu’s joint deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Avigdor 
Lieberman shares with Netanyahu a reliance upon nationalist and religious, right-
wing voters to maintain his position in power (Norlen 2012). It is important to 
recognise that current Prime Minister Netanyahu reclaimed his position as Prime 
Minister in the 2009 election after several losses since his last term in office from 
1996-1999. Although a mild change in Israel’s identity might be attributed to 
Netanyahu’s domestic policies of conservatism and less pragmatism than perhaps the 
government hard base, this does not suggest a significant change in Israel’s interests 
or foreign policies. On the contrary, it has meant that this government has been 
reluctant to repeal Israel’s strategic operations or alliances, thus achieving relative 
stability in Israel’s identity and interests.  
 
Perhaps due to this conservatism and simultaneous reluctance to relinquish its 
stance on certain foreign policy issues, Israel is an isolated Jewish state within its 
Middle Eastern region. Israel has actively furthered this isolation, rendering it a 
violation of Israeli law for citizens to visit many neighbouring states without 
Ministerial permission from the Interior (Dolev 2001: 147). These states, referenced 
as ‘enemy states’, include Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Yemen, several of 
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which share common borders with Israel. As such, the objective of the following 
section is to demonstrate that in addition to Israel’s national identity, its state interests 
have remained relatively stable over the past decade due to the slow pace of change 
between governments.  
 
FOREIGN POLICIES 
Having established that a substantial majority of Israel’s population identify 
themselves as being Jewish, both prior to and throughout the period of scope of this 
thesis, the next step is to argue that, similarly, Israel’s state interests have remained 
relatively constant. To do so, the first case study employed will be that of Israel’s 
relations with and approaches towards the Palestinian occupied territories of the West 
Bank and Gaza. This section will argue that Israel’s foreign policies towards the West 
Bank and Gaza, respectively, have remained relatively unchanged. Once evidenced, 
this suggests that a change in Turkish national identity and state interests must be a 
contributing factor to the demise in relations between Israel and Turkey. Nonetheless, 
the second case study of Israel’s relations with the United States will be used in order 
to demonstrate Israel’s ability to maintain continuity of its relations with the United 
States, representative of Israel’s connectedness to the West.  
 
ISRAELI – PALESTINIAN RELATIONS 
Migdalovitz suggests that the turning point in relations between Israel and Turkey 
became clear after Hamas’ electoral success in 2006 (2010: 13). For this reason, it is 
of particular importance that an examination of Israel’s relations with Palestinian 
occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza be conducted. At the conclusion of 
the Six-Day War, despite the 1947 UN partition plan for two states, Israel obtained 
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control over the West bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula, and the 
Golan Heights. Since this time, Israel has occupied the West Bank region but prevents 
Palestinians from applying for Israeli citizenship. Contrastingly, the Gaza strip has 
been left independent of Israeli occupation since 2005, although its airspace and 
waters are controlled by Israel militarily, according to findings of the UN’s 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2004 (ICJ 2004). Nonetheless, the occupants of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip are largely Arab Palestinians who gained refugee status 
following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, whereby Israel emerged as a sovereign state of 
Jewish majority. Since then, tensions have remained unresolved between the state of 
Israel and its Palestinian counterparts.  
 
 Since Hamas’ electoral success in 2006, Turkey’s AK party has demonstrated 
increasing support for Palestine over Israel. At the 2012 World Economic Forum, 
Erdoğan stated that the Palestinian issue was very important to Turkey “because the 
Palestinians are our brothers” (Ahren 2012). He furthered that Israel’s treatment of 
this Palestinian issue was like keeping people “in the largest open-air prison in the 
world”, additionally accusing the Jewish state of “killing innocent people, children, 
babies, women and the elderly in masses” (Ahren 2012). This furthered from 
statements made at the 2009 World Economic Forum where Erdoğan accused 
President Peres, in reference to Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, of “knowing 
how to kill well” (Ahren 2012). The irony is not lost on Israel, however, who brings 
to point Turkey’s paradoxical treatment of its stateless minority, the Kurds (Tisdall, 
2011).  
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When comparing the previous and current governmental policies of Israel 
towards the West Bank and Gaza over the past decade, it is evident that Israel’s 
policies over this issue have remained relative constant. As Netanyahu is quoted in 
The Economist, “the root of the conflict was and remains the (Palestinian) refusal to 
recognise the right of the Jewish People to a state of their own in their historic 
homeland” (“Israel’s Jewish identity 2011). Over the past decade it will be 
demonstrated that Israel’s objective has been to establish a Jewish state that is 
recognised as that by the Palestinians and the wider Arab and Islamic region. In order 
to secure itself as this sovereign state, Israel has claimed the necessity of barriers, 
such as the West Bank barrier along the historic 1949 Armistice line, often referred to 
as the ‘Green Line’ between Israel and the Palestinian territory which commenced 
construction in 2000 (See appendix A).  
 
This wall has formed a vital part of Israel’s foreign policy of securing itself as 
a Jewish state within the Middles Eastern region and was described by then Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak as also being “essential to the Palestinian nation in order to 
foster its national identity and independence without being dependent on the State of 
Israel” (Makovsky 2004).  The construction of this eight metre high concrete barrier 
to the West Bank has continued throughout the terms of Barak’s successors, both 
Ariel Sharon [2001-2006], acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert [2006-2009] and 
current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu [2006-present]. Thus, in this way, the 
Israeli approach towards its relations with the Palestinian territory of the West Bank 
has seen little change over the past decade or more, with the continued refusal on the 
part of Palestinian officials to recognise the Jewish State of Israel. 
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Additionally, on Israel’s policies towards the Gaza Strip, it is evident that 
Israel’s interests lie similarly in the acquiring of its recognition as a sovereign state, 
which the occupants of the Gaza Strip refuse to do. As such, Israeli policies towards 
the Gaza Strip to a large extent have remained congruent with its policies towards the 
West Bank, with the main anomaly being Prime Minister Sharon’s unilateral 
disengagement from Gaza in 2005 (Walker 2009: 144). However, the extent to which 
Israel has disengaged from this region is often questioned as Israel still maintains 
control over the land and sea borders into Gaza as well as the Gazan airspace (Tocci 
2007: 109). This control has continued since the official disengagement of 2005 and 
has further encompassed the Israeli imposed blockade of the Gaza Strip since the 
electoral success of Palestine’s Hamas party in 2006. This blockade, which 
subsequently led to the infamous 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla incident, has been 
accorded with playing a significant role as a pretext for Turkey to sharply reduce its 
relations with Israel (Brayer 2010; Cowell 2011; Keinon 2012).  
 
Moreover, following the electoral success of the Hamas government in 2006, 
historic tensions between Israel and Gaza, dating back to the 1967 Six-Day War, were 
reignited. The inception of Hamas instigated Israel to implement strict economic 
sanctions over the Gazan region, despite its most recent 2005 policy of unilateral 
disengagement (Sharp 2009). Since then, tensions have continued to mount, and 
resulted in ‘Operation Cast Lead’, or the Gaza War of 2008-2009 (Ben-David 2009). 
This military assault resulted in Israel’s continued and current economic blockade of 
the Gaza strip. The effects of this economic blockade have led to high unemployment, 
reduced incomes, inflated food prices, and a shortage of all food types, a source of 
fuel for further increased tensions (FAO with WFP 2007: 48 and; WFP 2007: 4). 
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Many within the international community, including the US and the EU, have 
supported a two-state solution which would consist of the division of current Israeli 
territory into two sovereign states, one being Israel and the other Palestine 
(Associated Press “EU backs Obama” 2011).  
 
However, Israeli governments throughout the past and at present are opposed 
to doing so for two reasons. Firstly, because the Palestinians refuse to recognise Israel 
officially as a Jewish state and as such don’t feel secure in giving Palestine 
sovereignty. Secondly, because of disagreement over the exact divisions of land, 
borders and the future security concerns this border problem poses (Yaar 2007 and 
Touval 2011). Through the examination of this case study, it was demonstrated that 
Israel’s foreign policy towards the West Bank and Gaza Strip has remained relatively 
constant, although this might come of no surprise given we are reminded that this 
decade of government began and ended under the return to office of Prime Minister 
Netanyahu in February 2009. Given the case has been made for Israel’s continuity of 
its interests in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the second case study of Israel’s foreign 
relations with the US will now be tested. 
 
ISRAELI – UNITED STATES RELATIONS 
Israel’s relations with the United States of America were officially initiated when the 
US, under President Truman, became the first state in 1948, jointly with the then 
Soviet Union, to declare the official recognition of the Jewish State of Israel. Since 
then, Israel has been described as an important and strategic partner to the US, given 
their “common democratic values, religious affinities, and security interests” (Zanotti 
2012: 24). Reflective of this bilateral partnership are the multifarious military, 
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economic, scientific, and trade agreements shared by the two countries, and the 
continuity of this bilateral relationship under the previous Republican governments of 
the United States, as well as the current Democratic administration of Obama (Addis 
2011: 25 and Indyk 2012). Economically, for example, Israel was the largest recipient 
of American aid from 1976 to 2004, totaling close to $3 billion in annual grants 
during this period (Sharp 2010). 
 
The significance of this relationship between Israel and the US has been 
reaffirmed by a long list of Presidents. For instance, then President J. F. Kennedy 
remarked that the US has continued a tradition of friendship with Israel since the time 
of President Woodrow Wilson (Bard 2012). Lyndon Johnson furthered this stating, 
“the United States and Israel share many common objectives”, a notion supported by 
succeeding Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan whom, endorsed, respectively, 
the US’ commitment to its strategic “friendship” with Israel (Bard 2012). The 
relationship was officially categorised as an alliance by President Bush when he 
announced, “the friendship, the alliance between the United States and Israel is strong 
and solid, built upon shared democratic values, of shared history and heritage…” 
(Bard and Schwartz 2005: 157). These statements are significant in their reflection of 
the ongoing Israeli-US relations since the inception of the Jewish State in 1948.  
 
Moreover, Obama reaffirmed the stability of this bilateral partnership in a 
2009 interview when he stated, “Israel is a strong ally to the United States” 
(Migdalovitz 2009: 7). Despite this, critics have been quick to criticise the Israeli-U.S 
alliance of experiencing periods of ‘ups and downs’ (Mark 2002 and; Zaher 2012). 
For example, disagreement over Israel’s policies with regards to its Palestinian 
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problem caused turmoil for relations between the governments of President Clinton 
and Prime Minister Netanyahu in the 1990s, yet under the Bush Administration and 
the term of Prime Minister Sharon, relations were restored (Mark 2002). 
Notwithstanding the misunderstandings pertaining to the perceived US demands of 
Obama to Israel in the way of restoring pre-1967 borders for a two-state negotiation 
in 2011, this bilateral relationship has remained strong under these respective current 
governments (Zaher 2012). The particular significance of this bilateral relationship for 
this chapter lies in the ability of these two states to maintain their diverging views on 
particular policies, without allowing this to affect their bilateral relationship to the 
point of deterioration.   
 
 In furtherance to the previous section, Israel’s domestic policies have not 
permitted its foreign relations, such as that with the US, to dictate changes in its 
foreign policies. Rather, the evidence suggests that over the past decade, Israel’s 
relations with the US have maintained continuity, despite Israel’s relentlessness in 
continuing its policies of blockading the Gaza Strip and the barrier between itself and 
the West Bank. This speaks volumes for the strength of Israel’s relations with the US 
given Israel has not conceded to America’s policy urges under the Obama 
administration (Zaher 2012). Despite this, proponents to the strength and stability of 
Israeli-US relations have used this aforementioned 2011 foreign policy speech by 
Obama as an example of the weakening relations between Israel and the US (Zaher 
2012). However, Obama refuted these claims by putting his reference to the pre-1967 
borders into context, stating that these must be taken into consideration in order to 
form mutually-agreed upon land swaps which should act as the basis for negotiations 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specifically, he stated, “by definition, (this) means 
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that the parties themselves - Israelis and Palestinians - will negotiate a border that is 
different than the one that existed on June 4, 1967”, concluding with a remark to 
critics of his speech that “if there’s a controversy, then it’s not based in substance” 
(Rabinovich 2011: 202). Through the use of this deposition, Obama refuted the 
circulating negative claims towards his government’s attitude towards relations with 
Israel, reaffirming the strength of the Israeli-US alliance (Bradley 2011).  
 
Nonetheless, in defense of Israel’s foreign policies towards to the occupied 
Palestinian territories, Prime Minister Netanyahu in 2009 demanded the Palestinians 
officially recognise Israel as a sovereign state of the Jewish people and that the 
Palestinian state be demilitarised in order for peace negotiations to be enabled (Addis 
2011: 26-27). Palestine has thus far declined, resulting in the ongoing failure of 
border and peace negotiations. Despite this failure to agree on a peaceful resolution, 
and perhaps symbolic of the strong Israeli-US alliance is that this failure has been of 
little consequence to Israeli-US relations. Mark suggests that this is because the US 
relies on relations with Israel to bolster its Middle Eastern policy of balancing 
competing interests within the region (2002). Whatever the reason, the significance 
lays in the strength of Israeli – US relations, regardless.  
 
Moreover, evidence of the military and economic strength of this alliance was 
indicated in 2009 when the US, under the Obama administration, facilitated Israel 
with the sale of over 55 GBU-28 bunker-buster bombs, an invaluable source of 
deterrence for Israel with the impending threat of Iran’s nuclear facilities (Borger 
2011 and; Zaher 2012). Additionally, despite America’s apparent plea for Israel to 
negotiate peace with Palestine, the US has explicitly defended Israel against UN 
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human rights abuse claims pertaining to their treatment of the Palestinians. The US 
has also contributed significantly to the financing of a short range (up to 40km) Israeli 
anti-rocket system, known as the ‘Iron Dome’, which is expected to cost 
approximately $215 million in development (Sharp 2009: 7-8). 
 
ISRAEL, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE WEST 
In order to connect the significance of this Israeli-US relationship to the deterioration 
of relations between Israel and Turkey, it must be accepted that the former reflects 
Israel’s connection to the West (Bard 2012). The purpose of establishing this 
connection of Israel’s identity as a Jewish state of Western affinity contributes to 
explaining possible Turkish motives for disengaging from its relations with Israel. 
This is because, as the following chapter suggests, Turkey’s identity has been 
redirected away from the Ataturk agenda of Westernising Turkey, back to its Islamic 
origins. 
 
The significance of establishing Israel’s state interests as having remained 
relatively stable over the past decade is that it goes towards providing an 
understanding of the deteriorated relations between Israel and Turkey. Thus far, this 
chapter has been concerned with arguing that Israel’s national identity has remained 
relatively unchanged over the past decade. Likewise, Israel’s national interests have 
remained relatively constant. This was illustrated by the above case studies of both 
Israel’s relations with Palestine and Israel’s relations with the US, respectively. 
Having evidenced that Israel’s identity and interests have not altered in a way, which 
mandated its withdrawal or downgrade in relations with Turkey, the following section 
will analyse a series of events and political tensions which will be referred to as 
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‘pretexts’. In this section I will argue that Turkey used these pretexts as a means to 
unilaterally disengage itself from relations with Israel. 
 
A DECADE OF PRETEXTS 
Warning and Kardas supported the notion that Turkey’s relations with Israel were 
representative of its Western identity when they stated, “Turkey’s Western 
commitment was underlined…by its relations with Israel” (2011: 124). With an 
understanding that Turkey’s bilateral relations with Israel were somewhat symbolic of 
Turkey’s connection to and affinity with the West, the breakdown in relations 
between Israel and Turkey can be viewed as indicative of Turkey’s redirection of its 
interests away from its Western affiliations and further towards its Middle Eastern 
heritage.  
 
Over the past decade, tensions between Israel and Turkey have mounted over 
a series of events that have during this period. Particularly since 2008, Turkey has 
exploited these events in a bid to distance itself from Israel, but why? In line with 
Wendtian constructivist thought, this section seeks to foreshadow Turkey’s AK party 
as having redirected Turkey’s national identity increasingly away from the West and 
further towards the Middle East. In 2003, tensions between Israel and Turkey arose 
due to Turkey’s refusal to support the US-led war on Iraq, which was in contrast, 
strongly supported by Israel (Giannotta 2012; Mallev et al. 2012; Zalewski 2011: 99 
and; Freedman 2010). Additionally, the 2004 Israeli assassination of the Gazan, 
Hamas’ spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and his successor, Abdulaziz al-
Rantisi, were significant events insomuch as they marked the second instance used by 
Turkey to evade its relations with Israel and inadvertently further distance itself from 
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the West (Kosebalaban 2010). The event was received in Turkey with grave 
negativity, spurring Erdoğan to describe Israel as a “terrorist state” (Ma’Oz 2012: 
173). This arguably led to Turkey’s support of Gaza throughout the Gaza War of 
2008-2009 (Alpay 2009). As a result, this incident allowed the state of Turkey, under 
its AKP leadership, to forge stronger ties with its Islamic neighbours as evidenced 
again by Erdoğan who stated, “the Palestinians are our brothers” (Ahren 2012; 
Khoury 2012 and; “Turkish PM Erdoğan pushes Palestinian statehood” 2011).  
 
Furthermore, Israel’s refusal of Turkish MPs to enter Gaza via Israel in 
September 2010 led to Turkey cancelling Israel’s participation in the multinational 
“Anatolian Eagle” air exercises, to be held that October (Inbar 2011 and; Freedman 
2010). Subsequently, in furthering their Gazan cause, Turkey’s Erdoğan publicly 
accused Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, of “knowing how to kill children well” 
(Aydintasbas 2009). This statement was made in reference to Israel’s military 
offenses against Palestine and was reiterated by Turkey again cancelling Israel’s 
participation in military exercises, this time the ‘Reliant Mermaid Operation’, stating 
that Israel “is the greatest threat to peace in the Middle East” (“Turkey PM: Israel is 
the main threat to Mideast peace” 2010).  
 
Moreover, as was discussed in the introduction, many scholars have argued 
that the culmination of these events mounted to the controversial May 2010 Mavi 
Marmara Flotilla raid. Scholarly research dictates that this Israeli raid marked the 
turning point in which Turkey ultimately disengaged its diplomatic ties with Israel 
(Ravid 2010; Lynch 2010; Cowell 2011; Batty 2011 and; Buck 2011). This 
deterioration of bilateral ties is again indicative of Turkey’s changing interests as it 
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evidences Turkey’s turn away from Israel and its realignment of foreign interests with 
other neighbouring Islamic states and entities such as Iran and Gaza (Warning and 
Kardas 2011: 124). We can better understand this severing of ties through the 
adoption of the following reasoning. Prior to the change in relations, Israel and 
Turkey had common enemies. However, with Turkey’s increasingly Islamic affinities, 
Israel’s enemies became defined as Turkey’s allies, weakening the rationale for a 
Turkish-Israeli alliance (Rubin 2012). For this reason, and by means of this series of 
pretext events, Turkey has successfully disengaged from its relations with Israel at 
present, so that it can further its Middle Eastern interests (Burris 2003 and; de Soto 
2011).  
 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout this chapter it has been established that Israel has maintained continuity 
of its Jewish national identity, representing approximately 76% of the current 
population. It was then demonstrated that Israel’s interests have similarly remained 
relatively constant, evidenced by the examination of two case studies, other than that 
of Israel’s relations with Turkey. It was evidenced that despite international pressures, 
such as the US’ pressure for Israel to make concessions towards Palestine in order to 
come to a peaceful solution, Israel has maintained its foreign policies as appropriate 
for its national interests and reflective of its identity. I then suggested that Israel’s 
connection to the West, through both its relations with the US and through the 
European heritage of its citizens, has had increasing ramifications on its relations with 
Turkey as Turkey furthers its interests with Islamic states. I proposed that this was 
due to a change in Turkey’s national identity, a view that is advanced in the following 
chapter.  
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Chapter Three:  
An examination of Turkey’s Identity and Interests  
 
 
hilst Israel’s national identity and state interests may have remained 
relatively stable over the past decade, the same cannot be said for that of 
Turkey. Through an understanding of the change to Turkey’s national identity and 
state interests, we can better understand the recent deterioration of relations between 
Israel and Turkey. Thus, the purpose of this chapter will be to demonstrate through a 
social means of inquiry that Turkey’s state interests have changed as the result of a 
change in its national identity. It will be demonstrated that a change in Turkey’s 
national identity has occurred domestically under the leadership of the AKP’s Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan.  
 
This will be achieved by comparing Turkey’s national identity prior to the 
inception of the AKP to that of Turkey’s national identity since the inception of this 
party in November 2002. Having established that there has been a deep change in 
Turkey’s identity this chapter will then examine Turkey’s foreign policy in two cases 
other than its relations with Israel in order to suggest that this change in foreign 
interests is not just bilateral, but part of a major shift owing to a change in Turkey’s 
identity. The first case study will analyse Turkey’s forging of stronger ties with Iran, a 
state that it had limited interaction with particularly throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
whilst still operating largely within the ideology of Kemalism. The second examines 
Turkey’s increasing divergence from the Western institution of the European Union 
(EU). These two case studies will demonstrate that Turkey’s national identity has 
undergone a sharp change and that due to this change, so too have Turkey’s national 
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interests. This will then allow for a discussion of the implications of these changes 
upon the Turkish-Israeli relationship currently. The results will conclude that 
Turkey’s increasingly Islamic identity has resulted in the distancing of itself from its 
historic endeavor to be seen as a Western democracy.  
 
CRITICS 
Despite the strong evidential support for Turkey’s change in identity, Huntington’s 
counter argument must be addressed and its weaknesses highlighted. Huntington’s 
‘failed civilisational shift’ questions whether Turkey ever managed to align itself with 
the West, thus implying that Turkish identity has always been Islamic (Huntington 
1996 and; Kardas 2009). In refute of this claim, Hale states that Turkey “ideologically 
separated itself from the Middle East after the establishment of the Republic in 1923” 
(Hale 1992: 681 and; Park 2007: 42). On this point, Kaplan contributes that 
Westernisation emerged as the “main ideological position for Turkey”, a notion 
furthered by Millman, who argues that this position was not only a model to guide 
Turkey’s development, but also an identity for Turkish foreign policy (Kaplan 2011: 2 
and; Millman 1995: 490). From these notions stems the following section which 
demonstrates Turkey’s deep shift in identity from Kemalist notions of westernisation 
and secularism to an Islamic heritage under the domestic reforms of the AKP.  
 
IDENTITY CONFUSION: DOMESTIC POLICIES 
Academics, such as Warning and Kardas, have examined Turkey’s move away from 
its links to the Western ‘world’ and further towards its links with the Middle East 
(2011: 133). However, where the sources are lacking is in bridging this notion of 
changed identity as causing a change in state interests. Thus, the purpose of this 
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chapter is to build upon the existing literature by offering a strong argument utilising 
case studies to show how a change in Turkey’s national identity has led to changes in 
its foreign policy, resulting in stronger ties with its Middle Eastern and Islamic 
neighbours. As Turkish author Taniz describes, Turkish politics under Erdoğan’s 
AKP has had a “moderate change, you could say neo-Ottoman” (Interview 5/7/12). 
Furthermore, Taniz describes the current identity crisis of Turkey as centering on this 
Islamist approach encouraged by Erdoğan’s popularly received anti-semitic 5 
discourse (Interview, 5/7/12). 
 
Constructivism prescribes that the identities of pluralistic societies emerge as 
the result of domestic struggles between various groups (Bozdaglioglu 2003: 26). 
This notion foreshadows the identity dilemma of Turkey which can be categorised as 
a pluralistic society insofar as it is a politically declared secular state, with a Muslim-
majority population, run by an Islamic dominated, albeit secular, AKP (Onis 1995: 
50). Furthermore, according to Turkey’s foreign minister, Davutoğlu, Turkey is a 
“Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf 
and Black sea country” (Davutoğlu 2008: 79). For this reason, the state of Turkey has 
been plagued by identity confusion. The implication of this dilemma is synthesised 
best by Bozdaglioglu, who notes that the “basic decisions regarding Turkey’s foreign 
policy (defense and national security) became inextricably intertwined with the 
national identity of Turkey” (2003: 7). In this way, the Islamic identity of Turkey 
prescribes that Turkey should align itself with other Islamic countries within its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Within this context, the term anti-semitism refers to discrimination, hostility or 
prejudice directed at Jews as a religious, racial, or ethnic group. In 2005 the US  
government defined anti-Semitism as “hatred toward Jews-individually and as a 
group-that can be attributed to the Jewish religion and/or ethnicity” US Department of 
State 2005) 
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region because Turkey’s interests are inextricably intertwined with this Islamic 
identity. This concept paves a social understanding for why Turkey is now concerned 
with forging stronger ties with its Middle Eastern neighbour, Iran, which in turn 
substantiates the claim that Turkey has undergone a fundamental reassessment of its 
identity as a secular state, but with a Muslim majority population.  
 
As such, the thesis of this paper, that Turkey’s state interests have changed, 
relies on the precondition that Turkish national identity has experienced some change 
or shift. To demonstrate this, it will firstly be shown that the identity of Turkey has 
undergone deep structural shift through sharp changes to domestic policies. Secondly, 
it will be argued that Turkey has actively changed its foreign policy as a result of this 
re-identification with Islam under the AKP. In order to demonstrate the former, the 
following section will establish that although the AKP claims to be secular, it is not.  
 
ISLAMIC ROOTS OF AKP 
In 2001 the Constitutional Court of Turkey shut down the Turkish political Virtue 
(Fazilet) Party (VP), claiming the party was incompatible with the secular character of 
the state (Eligur 2010: 243). At the closure of the VP party, its members divided into 
two groups and formed two new Islamist parties, the Felicity (Saadet) Party (FP) and 
the AKP (Finkel 2012: 73 and Eligur 243). This thus shrouds in doubt the AKP’s 
secularity. Further contesting the AKP’s secularism is the background of Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, the party’s founding leader. At the party’s point of creation, Erdoğan 
was still technically under a ban from politics due to anti-secular statements he had 
made during the late 1990s. Erdoğan had claimed, “democracy is not the goal but is 
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an instrument” and later remarked “Elhamdulillah [thank God] we are for the Sharia6” 
(Eligur 2010: 243). These sentiments are somewhat paradoxical given the party 
declares itself as a mainstream liberal-conservative, democratic party, “with no 
religious axis” (Hale and Ozbudun 2009: 20 and; Omtzigt, P. H. et al 2012: 87).  
 
Instead, this paper argues, in conjunction with Yavuz’ views, that the electoral 
win by the AKP in 2002 should be interpreted as a revival of the Islamic movement 
within Turkish politics (Yavuz 2003: 256). The Economist supported this view, 
describing the AKP as “mildly Islamist”, furthered by Reuters who refer to the AKP 
as “Islamist-rooted” and “Islamic-leaning” (“Turkey and Syria” 2012 and; Yackley 
2012). Further contrary to the AKP’s claim of secularity was Erdoğan’s speech in 
2011, whereby he said Turkey was a good example of Islam and democracy in co-
existence (“Turkey’s Erdogan makes case for Islam and democracy” 2011). In the 
same speech, Erdoğan also stated that there is nothing to fear from the influence of 
Islam in politics. From these statements, it is clear that claims pertaining to the AKP’s 
‘Islamist roots’ are not unjustified. More reasons why this is so will be examined 
below.  
 
In order to graphically represent the establishment and Islamic roots of the 
AKP, Diagram 3.1 demonstrates the evolution of the Islamist AKP from the 
dismantled VP7.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Note: Sharia is the religious law of Islam 
7 Note: Diagram 3.1 refers to what this paper terms the AKP, by JDP, abbreviating the  
English translation of Adalet ve Kalkinma (AKP) to Justice and Development Party 
(JDP). 
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Diagram 3.1 The Dynamics of Divergence and Reconsolidation (1997-2007) 
Source: Adapted from Eligur 2010: 34 
Through an examination of Diagram 3.1, we can see that the AKP, under the 
leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, had roots stemming from an Islamist identity, 
despite the party’s claims of secularity. This provides the testing mechanism in order 
to demonstrate the social influence that agents (like Erdoğan) can have on the identity 
of structures (like the State of Turkey). It might additionally be suggested, that the 
AKP has capitalised off the failures of previous governments, such as the VP, which 
did not eventualise their visions of an Islamist Turkey. Arguably, the AKP has 
achieved this by gradually redirecting the national identity of Turkey throughout its 
three consecutive terms in government. The AKP has achieved increasing popularity 
throughout these three consecutive electoral successes, achieving 34% of votes in 
2002, increasing to 47% of votes in the early general election of 2007, and then 
peaking at 49.8% of votes in the most recent general elections of June 2011. This 
chapter argues, in conjunction with Yavuz, that Erdoğan has used the popularity of his 
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socially Islamic, albeit secular by decree, AK party in order to restructure the political 
landscape and public sphere of Turkey (2003: 256).  
 
TURKEY AND ISLAM 
Historically, the Ataturk days of building the Turkish Republic under the Western-
inspired reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk from 1923 sought to align Turkey with 
Western ideologies, detaching itself from the Middle East and formally disabling 
Islam as the state religion (Hale 1992: 42 and; Warning and Kardas 2011: 124). As 
such, Turkish foreign policy has stemmed largely from this notion of Westernisation, 
influenced by its membership to Western institutions such as the United Nations (UN) 
in 1945, the Council of Europe in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) in 1952 and, more recently, its bid to join the EU (Millman 1995: 490 and; 
Cizre 2003: 228). However, since the inception of the AKP in 2002, an increased 
emphasis has been placed on Turkey’s national Islamic identity and the strengthening 
of alliances with neighbouring Islamic states. This foreign policy decision to rekindle 
Turkey’s Middle Eastern relationships, can be interpreted as reflecting the current 
increasing trend of Islam as the predominant Turkish faith, indicated by Figure 3.2 
which illustrates, through the triangulation of data, that between 2007 and 2012 
roughly 98.7% of Turkey’s 79,749,461 population [current at June 2012] are 
nominally Muslim (Central Intelligence Agency 2012 and; Bodgan and Bilken 2006).  
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Figure 3.2: Percentage of Turkish population nominally Muslim 2007-2012 
 
Source: KONDA (2007); Pew Research Centre (2011) and; CIA (2012b)  
 
The figures represented in Figure 3.2 highlight a significant break away from 
the Ataturk agenda of disabling Islam as the religion of the state, evidenced by the 
fact that close to 99% of the Turkish population is nominally Muslim at present. Of 
this 99%, research indicates that in 2007 96.8% were religiously motivated, that is, 
were either followers of Islam, believers of Islam or fully devout Islamists (KONDA 
2007). The same study concluded that the remaining 3.2% identified themselves as 
agnostic or atheist, identifying with other Muslims only by culture. Thus, these 
figures indicate that contrary to the Ataturk policy of a religion-free state, under the 
AKP government, 96.8% of the Turkish population identify religiously with Islam 
and as a Muslim.  
 
As such, this chapter does not argue that there has been a significant increase 
in the percentage of Turkey’s Muslims population before and after the inception of 
the AKP. Instead, I argue that there has been an increased significance and meaning 
attached to the concepts of ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslimism’, which has resulted in a changed 
national identity (Omidi 2011 and; Zalewski 2011). The AKP has been able to use 
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this changed attitude towards the state’s national identity and the Islamic networking 
that this has encouraged, as instruments of political mobilisation (Yavuz 2009: 2). 
Hence, it is within this period of scope, from the inception of the AKP into power at 
the end of 2002, which this chapter argues marks the turning point in Turkish national 
identity. This turning point in identity will be used as the justification of Turkey’s 
forging of stronger ties with neighbouring states such as Iran in recent times, as 
opposed to and perhaps ultimately at the cost of relations with other Western states.  
 
 Moreover, the significance placed upon religion by the AKP is underlined by 
their support and enforcement of compulsory religious classes focusing on Islamism 
within all public schools, starting from fourth grade (Yildirim 2011: 1). This is in 
contrast to historic regulations that allowed parents to decide on behalf of their 
children whether they would attend such religious education classes on an optional 
basis (Yildirim 2011: 2). Furthermore, spokespersons for the liberal wing of Islam, 
Alevis, have accused the AKP’s regulation of these religious classes as trying to 
assimilate students into Sunnism (“Turkish government rules out demands of Islamic 
sect Alevis” 2012). Additionally, contrary to Article 24 of the 1982 [current] Turkish 
constitutional establishment of freedom of religion, worship, and religious ideas, the 
AKP government has continued the role of the General Directorate for Foundations 
(GDF), which regulates non-Muslim religious groups and their institutions within 
Turkey (Constitution of Turkey 1982: article 24 and; US Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor 2007).  
 
Notwithstanding this view, some critics disagree with the depiction of the 
AKP as a Muslim focused party, employing the argument pertaining to Turkey’s ban 
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on wearing the Islamic hijab headscarf within universities and by civil servants in 
public buildings (Vojdik 2010: 661). However, such critics often fail to demonstrate 
that the AKP has supported amendments to the constitution that allowed for students 
to wear hijabs in universities and public institutions (Human Rights Watch 2008). 
Furthermore, the AKP supported the lifting of the ban on hijabs in many universities 
throughout 2010, claiming it would support students who were expelled based on 
their wearing of the hijab (Head 2010). However, these constitutional amendments 
were revoked by the Constitutional Court of Turkey which ruled that the amendments 
were in contradiction with the Turkish constitution’s secular principles outlined in 
Articles 2, 4 and 148, which ruled that citizens of Turkey could not wear religious 
symbols of any sort, including crosses, and not limited to headscarves, within any 
governmental or public institution (Vojdik 2010: 671 and “Article 2, Article 4 and 
Article 148 of the Turkish Constitution” 2008). Furthermore, the ruling by eleven 
judges indicated that a second court case could call for the banning of the AK Party 
within the Turkish political arena because of these “anti-secular activities” (“Court 
Annuls Turkish Scarf Reform” 2008).  
 
The purpose of these observations has been to provide the connection between 
Turkey’s change in national identity under the new domestic policies of the AKP, and 
its move away from secularism and further towards an Islamic heritage. That is, in 
providing the foundations for the social construction of Turkey’s newly embraced 
Islamic identity, we can then examine the re-strengthening of relations with Iran, 
Turkey’s Islamic neighbour. An indication of Iran’s Islamic population is reflected by 
Figure 3.3 which illustrates the mean percentile of Iran’s 74,819,000 being 98.53% 
nominally Muslim.  
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Figure 3.3: Percentage of Iranian population nominally Muslim 2007-2012 
Source: Pew Research Centre (2011); CIA (2012c); US Dept. of State (2006) 
What the results from this figure show us is that, similarly to Turkey, Iran has a very 
high percentage of its population who identify themselves with being Muslim. It is 
this Islamic identity in which both states share that has played a significant role in the 
rekindling of this regional friendship. 
 
TURKEY’S POLICY TOWARDS IRAN 
Throughout Chapter One the claim was established that interests presuppose identities 
because presumably, an actor cannot know what it wants before it knows who it is 
(Wendt 1999: 231). Thus, to answer the question of this paper, it must be 
demonstrated that a change in Turkish identity has occurred. Whilst the former 
section of this chapter was dedicated to showing a revival of Islamism within Turkish 
domestic politics, the following section asserts that Turkey’s change in identity is 
discernible through an examination of its changed relations with Iran. I argue that the 
revival of this relationship is an indication of Turkey’s move towards re-strengthening 
ties with its Middle Eastern neighbours, potentially at the cost of its relations with 
Israel.   
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Since the inception of the AKP in 2003, Turkey’s foreign policy has 
progressed from a ‘zero problem’ policy towards its neighbours to a policy of 
‘strategic-depth’, an act that demonstrates a shift towards recognising its place within 
the region of the Middle East (Davutoğlu 2008: 79-82 and; Bulent 2009). As 
Cagaptay worded it, “the AKP has shifted foreign policy away from the West (to) 
help catalyse a transformation of the Turkish identity towards Islamist causes” 
(Brinlee 2011). This act has arguably enhanced Turkey’s freedom of action and 
increased its regional and global leverage through the formation of new relationships 
with states, such as Iran, within its Middle Eastern region.  
 
Despite the volatility that Turkish-Iranian relations have experienced during 
2012 as a result of Syrian actions, relations on the whole have strengthened in recent 
times and under Turkey’s AK party as will be demonstrated. Turkey and Iran first 
initiated a “Treaty of Friendship” in April 1926 the principles of which outlined a 
friendship of neutrality and non-aggression (Sicker 2001: 136). Through the passing 
decades, this neutrality agreement was upheld and both countries signed various 
multilateral treaties, including the 1937 Treaty of Non-aggression, the 1955 Central 
Treaty Organisation and the 1964 Regional Co-operations for Development 
agreement. However, with the onset of the 1979 Iranian Revolution there became an 
imbalance of power within the Middle East and the political elites of Turkey 
downgraded Turkey’s ties with Iran in a bid to forge stronger Western affinities, 
claiming ideological and security concerns (Sinkaya 2012: 138). Turkey claimed that 
there existed a conflict of ideologies between Turkey and Iran after this revolution, 
whereby secular Turkey no longer shared commonalities with theocratic Iran (Singh 
2004). Furthermore, Turkish parliamentary officials expressed concern that Iran was 
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involved in supporting Islamist organisations and militant groups within the Turkish 
state (Karmon 1997). Thus, the Turkish decision to revive relations with Iran in recent 
years is once more indicative of the AK party’s redirection of state interests to engage 
with states that similarly identify with Islam.  
 
In response to the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, Turkey witnessed a 
military coup d’état during 1980, the stated aim of which was an expression of 
Turkish opposition to the threat against their secular ideologies and in fear for a 
dissemination of the Iranian revolution into Turkey (Biresselioglu 2010). There were 
also fears within the Turkish political arena of Iranian supported Kurdish terrorist 
organisations such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and other radical Islamists 
within Turkey (Biresselioglu 2010 and; Sinkaya 2012: 139-140). The suspicion that 
Iran was supporting the PKK, a Kurdish guerilla movement fighting an armed 
struggle against the Turkish state for greater cultural and political autonomy for Kurds 
within Turkey, was of particular concern to the Turkish government given its violent 
tendencies in the past where acts of terrorism by the PKK have been the result (Tahiri 
2007: 232 and; Jongerden 2008: 129). Thus, Turkey’s distancing of ties with Iran 
during the 1980 and 1990s was seen as a decision based on security and ideology, and 
represented Turkey’s allegiance to its process of Westernisation. 
 
TURKEY, IRAN, AND ISLAM 
Despite this period of unease, under Turkey’s current AK party, there has been a 
revival of relations between Turkey and Iran, arguably because this party embraces 
the common religion of Islam between the two states, something that was disregarded 
by previous more secularly driven Turkish governments (Biresselioglu 2010). This 
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claim is further supported by Sinkaya, who has described the rejuvenation of Turkish 
relations with Iran as a divergence from the pre-AKP approach towards the West, 
reflective of Turkey’s new Middle Eastern interests (Sinkaya 2012: 137-138; Kardas 
2010 and; Altunisik and Martin 2011). With this in mind, rapprochement with Iran 
was reached, both politically and economically, under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s 
tenure. Economic trade between the bilateral alliances has increased under the AKP 
from $1.2 billion in 2001 to $4.3 billion in 2005 and in 2010 Turkish-Iranian trade 
totaled $13 billion. This was exceeded by a $15 billion market in 2011, with Turkey’s 
primarily imported goods consisting of oil and natural gas, newly secured sources of 
energy for the state (Sinkaya 2012: 141 and; Biresselioglu 2010).  
 
A REDIRECTION OF TURKEY’S INTERESTS  
Larrabee has described this rekindling of relations with Iran as an act by Turkey to 
establish itself as a diplomatic actor in the Middle East with the purpose of improving 
its relations with the Islamic world, a departure from Turkish foreign policies aimed 
towards the West under previous governments (2007). It is this re-identification with 
Turkey’s Islamic neighbours, such as, but not limited to Iran, which is indicative of 
Turkey’s shift in focus away from the West and towards the Middle East, particularly 
since Turkey voted against its Western allies in the June 2010 vote regarding a new 
UN sanctions regime targeting Iran’s military operations (Larrabee 2012). Although, 
it should be highlighted that despite the continued strength in economic relations into 
2012, political disagreement has arisen since Iran’s reaction to the Syrian crisis as the 
Arab Spring continues to play out this year (Vatanka 2012). Despite this divergence 
in attitudes, the significance of this bilateral relationship is in its contribution to 
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establishing Turkey as a regional player within the Middle East, one that is aspiring to 
expand its networks within this region (Larrabee 2012).  
 
It has been demonstrated, through the analysis of this bilateral relationship 
between Turkey and Iran, that Turkey has, through the strengthening of regional 
alliances with Islamic neighbours, made the motions to put its historic ties with the 
Western world second to those with its regional relationships. To further this claim, 
the same case study analysis could be applied to Turkey’s relations with states such as 
Iraq or Egypt. For example, Turkey’s divergence from the West was evident when it 
sided with Iraq, or at least did not side with the US, post the September 11 2011 
attacks on the US, by refusing to permit American troops transit through Turkish 
territory in order to gain access to Iraq during the 2003 invasion. The decision 
reflected public opinion polls of which 94% voted in favour of refusing American 
entry for this purpose (Finkel 2012: 71 and; Ugur 2004: 167). Having established thus 
far that Turkey is no doubt focusing on rekindling old ties to neighbouring and 
Islamic states within its Middle Eastern region, the second case study pertaining 
specifically to Turkey’s involvement with and endeavor to become a member of the 
EU will now be examined.  
 
TURKEY’S POLICY TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN UNION 
This chapter has so far demonstrated that since the inception of the AKP, Turkish 
national identity has been increasingly reflecting its Islamic roots as opposed to its 
Western affinities. This second section is concerned with a case study of the relations 
between Turkey and the EU, which will further highlight Turkey’s turn away from the 
West in favour of its Middle Eastern ties. Insofar as Turkey has ‘turned away’ from 
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the EU, Rabasa and Larrabee argue that this increasing interest in regional Middle 
Eastern alliances, such as the previously explored Iranian example, has been 
influenced by, “elements within the AKP whose foreign policy views are religiously 
motivated” (2008). Warning and Kardas further support this, claiming that Turkey’s 
interests have been redefined by the AKP who have, “made the strategic choice to 
reintegrate Turkey into the regional Arab political system” (Warning and Kardas 
2011: 128 and; Abaza 2009). Turkey, under the political leadership of the AKP, 
accomplished this by reasserting itself within the Middle Eastern region through the 
strengthening of alliances with other Islamic states such as Iran and Iraq. This allowed 
Turkey to redefine its identity as a Middle Eastern state, rather than a Western state, 
which had been the focus under previous governments partial to Kemalism. Thus, 
with this in mind, the purpose of this section will be to further demonstrate how 
Turkey’s change in identity has resulted in a redirection of its foreign interests away 
from the West and its institutions such as the EU, instead focusing more on regional 
alliances, which have thereby enabled this distancing from the EU.  
 
This chapter suggests that Turkey is distancing itself from this multilateral 
relationship in order that it can further pursue new foreign interests within its Middle 
Eastern region. Giannotta supports this claim, asserting that Turkey’s foreign interests 
no longer lie in obtaining the acceptance of the EU (2010). What is more, Zalewski 
furthers this claim again with regards to the redirection of Turkey’s foreign interests, 
stating that Turkey has “drifted somewhat from the West…(and) under the rule of the 
AKP has rediscovered its neighborhood” (2011: 98). Thus, in this way, it is clear that 
under the influence of the AKP, the change in Turkey’s national interests have been 
dictated by the rediscovered significance of its Islamic national identity. 
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Prior to the AK party’s inception into power, the Turkish government’s socio-
political movements towards joining the EU had become intertwined with the 
Kemalist ideology of ‘Europeanising’ Turkey (Yavuz 2003: 255). In a bid to further 
their goal of acceptance into the EU, then Prime Minister Özal formally applied for 
full membership, reaching a package of 97,000 pages of laws and treaties obliging to 
a wide range of policy regulations ranging from competition policy to food safety and 
financial control, which he perceived would fulfill the EU’s requirements for 
acceptance (Findley 2010: 372 and; Finkel 2012: 89). However, in 1999 at the 
Helsinki summit, despite being recognised as a membership candidate, Turkey was 
instructed it was required to meet certain further conditions before membership talks 
could begin (Findley 2010: 373). This has been a long and ongoing process, with 
membership prospects still unknown.  
 
OPPOSITION TO TURKISH ACCESSION WITHIN THE EU 
Within the EU, France, Germany and Austria have remained in opposition to Turkish 
membership to the EU, with Greek President Karolos Papoulis joining in opposition 
in 2009 as a response to the Turkish occupation of Cyprus.  French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy has made his opposition to Turkey’s possible accession into the EU well 
known. In 2011 he was quoted at a news conference in Armenia stating that Turkey’s 
“role is outside the EU. France does not see Turkey in the EU” (“Sarkozy insists” 
2011). Belgian Prime Minister Van Rompuy backed this view stating, “Turkey is not 
a part of Europe and will never be part of Europe” (Tait 2009). Germany and Austria 
are similarly opposed to Turkey’s membership to the EU, offering instead that Turkey 
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should be given a privileged partnership of closer ties to the EU but no decision-
making powers (Morelli 2011: 3).  
 
 Statistically, since the opening of membership talks with the EU in December 
of 2004 into 2005, there has been a decline in support for Turkish membership within 
the EU. Within the first twelve months of talks, a Eurobarometer survey concluded 
that 44% of citizens from member states were in favour of Turkey joining the EU 
(Eurobarometer 255, 2006: 72). However, by September-October of the same year, 
support had already declined to 28% whilst 59% of the EU-25 members were against 
Turkey joining the EU (Eurobarometer 66, 2006: 223). These figures are broken 
down in Figure 3.4, which illustrates the opposition from within the EU of Turkish 
membership.  
Figure 3.4 EU Opposition to Turkish Membership Sept-Oct 2006 
Source: Barysch 2007: 3 and; Eurobarometer No. 66, December 2006: 223-224, 226 
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Figure 3.4 illustrates the high percentage of opposition from within member 
states of the EU towards Turkey’s accession into the EU. Austria (AT) leads the 
opposition at approximately 90%, followed closely by Germany (DE) at 80%, France 
(FR) at 70%, and Italy (IT) at around 60% opposition. The least opposition was found 
in Spain (ES) with just fewer than 40% opposed to Turkey’s accession. Thus, it is 
evident that not only is opposition from within the EU for Turkey’s accession high, 
but member states, such as France and Bulgaria, have explicitly stated that Turkey 
does not belong to the EU, Europe, or therefore, the West. 
 
DECLINING DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP 
Throughout the AKP’s three consecutive terms in power, there has been an obvious 
wane in Turkish public support of EU membership. Prior to the AK party’s leadership 
from 2002, polls indicated throughout the late 1990s around 75% of the Turkish 
population favoured Turkey’s membership to the European Union (Interview: Taniz 
5/7/12). This is in contrast to polls which indicate that since mid 2006 this public 
support for Turkish accession into the EU has decreased to 32% with more recent 
polls in 2011 indicating that only 13% are in favour of Turkish cooperation with the 
EU (Eurobarometer poll 2006 and Zalewski 2011: 101). These figures are therefore 
indicative of Turkey’s increasingly declining interest towards membership to the EU 
and the West, redirecting this interest towards aligning itself within the Middle 
Eastern region with which it shares a common Islamic affiliation.  
 
This realignment of Turkey’s interests away from the EU and, consequently, 
the West, is supported theoretically by constructivism, which dictates that once an 
identity is structured, states will institutionalise this identity at both domestic and 
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international levels (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 62). Thus, at the 
international level, Turkey is enacting its Islamic identity in interstate normative 
structures, such as the AKP’s regime and the state’s security, by securitising its ties 
with its Middle Eastern neighbours, interests that Turkey would not have explored 
had it maintained its secularist approach towards obtaining a ‘Western’ identity within 
the international arena (Bozdaglioglu 2007: 137).  
 
Additionally, a sign that the AK party has done little to further its own cause 
for acceptance by the EU, is literally that at the exit of the Bosphorus Bridge in 
Istanbul, which reads, “Welcome to Asia” (emphasis added). This sign is somewhat 
reflective of the Turkish state, which is represented by just 3% of total land mass 
geographically located on the European continent. For this reason, it is not of surprise 
that its populates do not identify themselves as being European of Western, rather, 
this was perhaps a construction of identity under the Ataturk mentality (Kapucu and 
Palabiyik 2008: 24). This is one reason why the EU has emphasised that Turkey, in 
accordance with the Copenhagen criteria, will be monitored for its relations with its 
neighbours, settlements of border disputes, and a comprehensive Cyprus settlement 
before membership would be offered. This is a test that Turkey might not pass given 
its redirection of focus on building its Islamic identity and ties (Findley 2010: 373 
and; “Negotiating Framework” 2005). 
 
Uncharacteristic of Turkey’s historic tendency to “reform ‘for Europe’s sake’” 
was its turn away from the EU and further towards identifying with its new regional 
allies (Zalewski 2011: 97). Further suggestive of the AKP’s turn away from the EU 
and the West was its unwillingness to support NATO’s coalition against Saddam 
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Hussein in 2003 (Warning and Kardas 2011: 132 and; Zalewski 2011: 97). However, 
perhaps of more significance was the reaction by Germany, France, and Belgium who 
vetoed the US request for NATO to make plans to protect Turkey from Saddam 
Hussein if he launched an attack (Black 2003). Here, not only is it observable that 
Turkey opposed NATO on the issue of Iraq, which is in and of itself indicative of 
Turkey’s identification with a pro-Islamic neighbour, but it is also reflective of some 
significant Western states’ rejection of Turkey. 
 
This disengagement from the West on behalf of Turkey in recent years has 
been encouraged by the state’s engagement with neighbouring states within its region, 
summarised by Raptopolous who states that, “important sections of the Arab world, 
due to their common Muslim faith, represent a logical outlet of solidarity to Turkey” 
(2004). On this point, it has been suggested that with Turkey’s further strengthening 
of regional ties, the point might come where it decides the EU needs Turkey more 
than Turkey needs the EU which could lead to Turkey’s potential rejection of any 
membership offer made by the EU (Finkel 2012: 103). Thus, through the analysis of 
this case study, it has been made clear that with Turkey’s decreased efforts towards 
obtaining EU membership in recent years, there has simultaneously been a decline in 
support for Turkey’s membership to this Western institution from member states. It is 
therefore now evident that through the analysis of these two case studies, Turkey has 
actively redirected its foreign interests away from the West and increasingly seeks its 
interests in the Middle East.  
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IMPACT ON TURKISH – ISRAELI RELATIONS 
Through this examination of Turkey’s identity and interests, it was demonstrated that 
Turkey has decreased its ties to the West through its decreased relations with the EU 
whilst simultaneously strengthening its ties to Islamic neighbours such as Iran. This 
was suggested to have been reflective of deep changes to domestic policies, and 
indicative of Turkey’s sharp redirection of its state interests. Due to this redirection of 
Israel’s interests increasingly away from the EU and further towards Islamic 
neighbouring states, Turkey has unilaterally disengaged from its relations with Israel 
as their interests no longer align to the extent that they once did. 
  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated, through the lens of constructivism, that Turkey’s 
identity has undergone a sharp redirection since the inception of the AKP. As was 
demonstrated, this party has encouraged the Islamic roots of Turkey to be recognised 
by the Turkish people, redirecting the Turkish national identity away from its 
Western, secular affinities, and replacing it with a national Islamic identity. Once this 
change in identity was established, it was demonstrated that, in accordance with 
Wendtian constructivist theory, a change in the national identity of a state necessitates 
a change in its interests. Through the analysis of two case studies, that of Turkish-
Iranian relations and Turkish relations with the EU, this chapter demonstrated that this 
change in interests was not limited to Turkey’s bilateral relations with Israel. Rather, 
it was established that Turkey’s interests have been redirected away from the Ataturk 
agenda of Westernisation and secularity in order to allow for the forging of stronger 
ties with neighbouring Islamic states. This notion was supported by Kardas who 
stated that had the Mavi Marmara incident occurred ten to fifteen years ago, previous 
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Turkish governments would probably have overlooked the incident, a further 
indication of the change in Turkey’s foreign policy and national interests (Interview 
7/7/12). Thus, Turkey’s foreign interests have evidently changed as a result of the 
deep changes in national identity sparked by changes in domestic policy under the 
leadership of Erdoğan’s AK party.  
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Conclusion:  
The role of Identity and Interests in the Meltdown  
 
 
BRIDGING THE GAP: FINDINGS OF THE SOCIAL INQUIRY 
his thesis examined the role attributed to identity and interests in the recent 
deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey. I analysed the domestic 
and foreign policies of Israel and Turkey, respectively, in order to determine the 
stability of each state’s identities, respectively. In doing so, I suggested that over the 
past decade, Israel’s national identity has experienced a slow pace of change which 
has resulted in the relatively stability of its identity and interests. However, when 
examining the national identity and foreign interests of Turkey, I demonstrated that 
there has been a sharp redirection of Turkey’s national identity away from the Ataturk 
agenda of Westernisation and secularisation, which has simultaneously resulted in 
changing Turkish interests as well. Through an understanding of this change in 
Turkish identity, I suggested that Turkey has unilaterally disengaged from its relations 
with Israel as it now seeks to align its interests with neighbouring Islamic and Middle 
Eastern states.   
 
 Chapter One outlined the theoretical framework for understanding the 
significance of identity and interests to state alliances as a social means of inquiry. 
Through the deconstruction of Wendtian Constructivism it was demonstrated that 
“identities are the basis of interests” (Wendt 1992: 398). For this reason, the following 
two chapters were concerned with analysing the changes in the identities of Israel and 
Turkey, respectively. This was done using the definitional parameters outlined in 
Chapter One, which articulated three core assumptions of identity. Firstly, that 
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identity formation is reliant upon social construction (Hopf 2002: 2). Second is the 
relational comparisons argument, which dictates that identities are incomplete without 
an understanding of oneself in relation to others. Lastly, is that identities are not fixed 
or stable entities, but shape, influence, and generate interests  (Jepperson, Wendt and 
Katzenstein 1996: 21 and; Shafique 2011). For these reasons, it was determined that 
both domestic and international environments must be taken into account when 
assessing changes in national identity. With this in mind, a critical analysis of 
Wendtian constructivism ensued, detailing the processes of the social inquiry that 
would be applied as the mechanism for analysis in the proceeding two chapters.  
 
 Chapter Two assessed the identity of Israel over the past decade, concluding 
that the slow change in identity was accountable to the relatively stable domestic 
policies of the state. Given that this relative stability was not extended to its foreign 
relations with Turkey, an examination of two other foreign relations of Israel was 
carried out, that of Israel’s policies towards Palestine and secondly, its relations with 
the United States. However, the findings of these studies concluded that Israel’s 
foreign policies in both cases had, like its identity, experienced slow change, but 
overall relative stability. This inferred that the deterioration of bilateral relations 
between Israel and Turkey was perhaps contingent not on changes to Israel’s identity 
or interests, but rather on those of Turkey. Lastly, I studied a series of political 
tensions and events over the past decade and suggested that Turkey had used these as 
pretexts in order to disengage from its relations with Israel.  
 
 As such, Chapter Three was concerned with ascertaining why Turkey might 
disengage from its relations with Israel. The same process of testing Turkey’s identity 
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was taken, as when testing Israel’s in the previous chapter. Through a detailed 
examination of the domestic policies of Turkey it was evident that sharp shifts in 
Turkey’s national identity had occurred over the past decade. It was demonstrated that 
this change was enabled and encouraged by the ruling party of the AKP, whom have 
held power consecutively by means of electoral success during this decade.  In order 
to demonstrate that this change in identity was not only reflected in the deterioration 
of Turkey’s bilateral relationship with Israel, two other case studies were examined. 
The findings demonstrated that changes were not limited to this bilateral relationship, 
but were extended to encompass significant changes in Turkey’s interests with Iran 
and the EU, respectively. Thus, Turkey’s interests were argued as having been 
redirected away from its relations with the West and further towards securing ties 
with its Islamic and Middle Eastern neighbours, reflective of Turkey’s turn away from 
the Ataturk regime of westernisation and secularism under this AKP government.  
 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The findings of this thesis contribute significantly to the literature surrounding the 
recent deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey. It bridged gaps in the 
literature on this topic by engaging in a social means of inquiry in order to better 
understand the significance of identity and interests in alliance formation and 
destruction. However, due to the narrow scope and research constraints of this thesis, 
the results presented are limited insomuch as they identify the role played by identity 
and interests in the case study of Israel and Turkey only. As such, this thesis provides 
an important framework for others to extend upon.  
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In this increasingly globalised world, alliances between states are often 
developed to further a state’s relative or absolute wealth, influence, power, and 
therefore survival. For this reason, the actions of State ‘A’ may be perceived by State 
‘B’ as a threat against their survival, be it through material gains or increased wealth 
both of which equate to increased power, which then drives one of these states to 
increase/reduce its relations with the other accordingly. Therefore, it is the social 
construction of this perception that needs further attention and analysis. For this 
reason, the value of this thesis has been in the demonstration of a social inquiry into 
the meltdown in relations between Israel and Turkey as a case study to demonstrate 
the significance of identity and interests in alliance formation and deterioration. Since 
alliances within the international arena create and affect the balance of power in 
international relations, it is vital that we understand the social processes of alliance 
formation and deterioration. 
 
* * * 
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Appendix B2:  
Transcript: Alon Liel Interview 10th January 2012 
 
Location: Jerusalem, Israel 
Date: 10/01/12 
Interviewer: Katherine Cook (Y) 
Interviewee: Alon Liel (I) 
 
Interview commenced 16:00  
 
Y:  How would you describe the current relationship between Israel and Turkey as 
of the Flotilla Raid? 
 
I:  Turkey has become a hostile country to Israel; the relations are bad. I would 
say almost non-existent when it comes to the political- diplomatic level. There 
are still commercial relations in a surprising volume and still some cultural 
and sport relations but when it comes to the political and diplomatic contact 
between the countries it is almost non-existent. 
 
Y:  I have read that you say the relationship between Turkey and Egypt, in light of 
the Arab Spring, might have influenced the relationship between Israel and 
Turkey. Do you think that this relationship is worsening the bilateral ties 
between Israel and Turkey? 
 
I:  First of all, Turkey on the bilateral level has its grievances stemming from the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflicts there are some bilateral problems, so the main 
thing is Turkey-Israel and if you want, the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the 
fact that we didn’t make any progress in the last three years. The situation in 
Egypt is just further complicating the Israeli situation in the region but I don’t 
see it as directly connected to the bilateral ties between Israel and Turkey as 
such. If this process of Islamisation of Egypt will continue then it is further 
isolating Israel in their region and Turkey can maybe make use of it a little bit. 
But I don’t see these two things necessarily strongly connected. The bilateral 
relations between Israel and Turkey are strongly connected to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, not with the problems with Egypt.  
 
Y:  So you say the relationship between Israel and Turkey, politically, is ‘bad’ at 
the moment; the Israeli Prime Minister’s office says that Israel hopes to find a 
way to overcome the dispute and will continue to work towards this goal. Do 
you think they are doing so, successfully?  
 
I: Israel is interested in overcoming the dispute, but I don’t think Israel is ready 
to do what the Turks are expecting, which is first of all an apology for the 
Flotilla, but also a movement on the peace process, maybe even including the 
Hamas and maybe removing the siege from Gaza. So, I don’t see Israel as 
ready to do it so I don’t see a possible breakthrough.  
 
Y: Do you think Israel should be meeting Turkey’s demands? 
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I: I think, yes. But I understand the leadership of Israel’s assumption that since 
the chance of a breakthrough with the Palestinians is minimal the chance that 
Turkey will love us in the near future is very small. So, the Israeli behaviour is 
based on an assessment that there will be no breakthrough in the peace 
process. So, I understand the logic of the Israeli behaviour, but I don’t agree 
with it. And I don’t agree with it on the Israel and Palestinians, who are very 
much needed and a breakthrough would help us with Turkey too.  
 
Y:  How do you think the relationship has changed specifically under the Erdogan 
government since 2003? 
 
I: First of all, definitely there was a change and Erdogan being religious and a 
Muslim is by definition close to the Arab world than Israel. But, I think the 
very, very basic principal in the Turkish foreign policy since 1967 is an 
indexation of the Israeli-Arab conflict to the Israeli- Arab relations, meaning 
until 1967 it didn’t exist because we were both in the camp of the United 
States in the Cold War and there was no occupation of Jerusalem. But since 
June 1967 when we occupied East Jerusalem, they indexed. So, when there 
was a period of time of troubles- wars, the relations deteriorated. When it 
moved, or looked like it moved, the relations improved. So, we see this 
pattern, this principal also during Erdogan’s period of time. For instance, 
during the Kemalists, I was there in the 80s and the relations were very bad 
and it was not Erdogan but because we have the war in Lebanon and Sabra 
and Shatila and with the annexation of the Golan Heights and now we are in 
Erdogan’s time and we also have ups and downs that were related to what 
happened in the conflict. 2004 was very bad because we killed the leaders of 
the Hamas and 2005 was very good because we withdrew from Gaza and they 
kind of follow what was going on. Again in 2006 it was not a good year 
because we had the war in Lebanon. And 2007-2008 was good because we 
were negotiating with the Palestinians and the Syrians and since 2009 we have 
nothing and its bad again. So, there is this indexation. It is true that he brought 
a very aggressive style, Erdogan himself, he attacked Israel in a way that 
maybe only Ahmadinejad did. Although people are affected by this style, 
content wise, this indexation is the main principal. 
 
Y: You gave a presentation on this cycle of good then bad relations, a short while 
ago, do you think that the relationship is ever going to be stable, or will it 
always be up and down? 
 
I: They were never stable, we have relations for 63 years and the relations were 
never stable. 
 
Y:  So that means the future is not going to be stable either? 
 
I:  Unless we have peace between Israel and the Arabs and even then, I’m not 
sure it would be stable, because Turkey has other problems in the region… 
Cyprus, the Kurds, Armenians. Why should it be stable, I mean it’s a Muslim 
country and a Jewish country. It’s not exactly the Netherlands or Denmark. It 
is a country in the region that has a lot of interests and the region was never 
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stable so why do we expect stability? There were sharp ups and downs even in 
the 50s and 60s before the 1967 war with a very good beginning in the 50s, 
and then it went down for all different kinds of reasons. I don’t foresee 
stability. This situation now, by the way, is stable. But, I don’t know for how 
long. 
 
Y: Do you think the instability has anything to do with Turkey’s inability to be 
either completely Western or completely Middle Eastern; they’re sort of 
fighting to be both? 
 
I: No…Israel has an attitude saying we can never do something wrong. So, if 
they don’t like us, there are another reasons. So they say its because they 
cannot get into the EU, or they say it’s to lead the Muslim world. So, Israelis 
like to say that this crisis is not because of the Israeli behaviour in anyway and 
there are other reasons. Partially, only partially there is something to it. But, 
the main reason was happening on the ground and it is between us and the 
Palestinians, and as a result, especially with the Flotilla, now between us and 
Turkey. So, I don’t buy it, I don’t but it that this…you know also, there is a 
very big change in Turkish foreign policy that is not related to Turkish foreign 
policy. Turkey was in a way in the pocket of the West for a few decades and 
now it is an all around player. A Balkan player, a Europe player, an Asian 
player, a player in the Middle East, you know, it sees itself playing all over, so 
it’s definitely a change and also there is more assertiveness. We took it from 
English that when there is a young guy who is ambitious, we call him a 
‘wanna be’- he wants to be, and Turkey is the ‘wanna be’ of the region. They 
want to influence the world so it is effective and of course its policy towards 
Syria, Libya, Iraq, Israel, towards Egypt, they’re the regional player and they 
are a regional power even So, obviously, it has something to do with Israel 
too. But, usually if I examine the key factors, it’s the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
recently also the bilateral problem that is very recent. It’s very new. We never 
had a bilateral problem. We never killed Turks. The Israeli army never, we did 
once, but without knowing it was Turks in the First Lebanese War when we 
bombarded. We bombarded the palace in which there were Turkish workers 
but we didn’t know and we thought they were Lebanese fighters and so on but 
in the Marmara we knew they were Turks and we killed them, so it is the first 
direct attack bilaterally and we also don’t have a common border. And so the 
chance we have a territorial conflict is non existent so it is usually the Arab-
Israeli conflict.  
 
Y:  So, aside from this view, where do you think Turkey belongs? The East or the 
West? 
 
I: They belong to wherever they think they belong. And they think they belong 
to everything. Why should I think differently? For many years they have 
belonged to the West, with NATO and now they don’t want to belong to 
anyone. So, this is how they feel.  
 
Y:  Aside from economics, how important do you think the relationship is 
between Israel and Turkey?  
	   93	  
I: I personally think it’s very important but there are different views. When I 
joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thirty years ago, and I know long before 
I arrived, the Israeli number one goal in our foreign policy was to legitimise 
ourselves in the region. This was the dream. So, when this was the dream, 
relations with Turkey were extremely important. But, it’s not the dream 
anymore; there is the feeling now that Israeli diplomacy, at least on the 
political level that we don’t need the Middle East. We have the United States, 
Europe, China, India we have Australia, we have Canada, why do we need the 
Middle East? The Arabs do not like us and they can go to hell. There is this 
attitude now, so the fact that the diplomats in my generation saw it as 
extremely important, doesn’t mean that this is how the politicians feel today. 
Also, things have changed, forty years ago, Israel was a very weak country, 
small, weak economically and we were always doing quite well militarily, but 
we were small in economy and small in population but we are a lot stronger 
now, especially economically. We can pave our ay without the Arabs in a 
way. Even if we have to fight a war every several years, we can defend 
ourselves. We are building walls around the country along the boarders and 
some we have already along the border with Lebanon, with Syria, and now we 
are building along Egypt, the Palestinians, and Jordan so Israel is much more 
confidant of its ability to survive in the region than thirty years ago. Things 
have changed over the years. The Minster of today who is shaping the 
diplomacy towards Turkey, Lieberman, thinks if they don’t want us, we don’t 
need them, we’ll manage. 
 
Y: Do you agree? 
 
I: It is connected and goes far beyond Turkey. I disagree because I think it is 
very unhealthy to build a fortress here that will have nothing to do with the 
region. Not only security wise but also morally and psychologically. If you 
came to this region, why shouldn’t we be part of it? And the claim of the Arab 
wars…by isolating ourselves and surrounding we are proving that we are 
foreigners here. You know, my parents came to Israel, when it was still 
Palestine, my mother came in the early 40s and she was never an Israeli, she 
was always a German, I was the Israeli. I was the first generation of Israeli and 
I very much wanted to be an Israeli but now they tell us we are not Middle 
Eastern, we are Europeans. Why shouldn’t we go back? Why don’t we go 
back to Germany? Why do we have to stick together in this place if everybody 
hates us? It’s an observation not only on the Israeli- Turkey link but also on 
our role here in the region and if peace is important or not. Many people think 
not only that peace is not important but they also think peace is impossible. So 
if peace is impossible the Arabs will never like us and if they will never like 
us then why bother? There are six plus billion people and one plus billion 
people are Muslim, we still survive. Why do I need all this six billion? I 
disagree with it, but this is coming up especially now after the last two years 
when Turkey attacked us in a very brutal way. More and more people say… 
are giving up. Very few Israelis are going to Turkey now and are boycotting 
Turkey in fact on the Tourism level, not on the commercial level. 
 
Y: Do you think Israel needs Turkey or Turkey needs Israel more? 
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I: It’s again coming back to the question. For many, many years, when they 
approached, the Israeli approach was thanks to the Turks for being ready to 
have diplomatic relations so we needed them much more than they needed us 
for many, many years. And also the fact that we had an Embassy in Turkey 
was something that we were very proud of and we showed the Arab world. 
We also had relations with Iran for twenty years. We wanted to be part of the 
region and it was extremely important but not so important to them. Israel was 
not a strong country, they had other interests and the Muslim countries were 
always… had more votes in the UN and connected to the third world they 
needed so for years it was very unbalanced and they decided if the relations 
would be good or bad and we accepted anything they chose. The fact that we 
did not apologise now means that things are more balanced. That it is not… 
 
Y: Do you think this was Israel’s aim? To balance the powers of the region? 
 
I: Yes. The policy of Israel before this foreign minister was another culture that 
we didn’t know before. He comes from the Soviet Union and grew up there, it 
is a different size of country, different mentality and he says he is not hiding 
that he thought the Israeli mentality was too apologetic and he wants a more 
aggressive and assertive policy. If somebody is criticising us don’t defend 
yourself, criticise back; he’s attacking, so attack back. So, yes, you, criticise 
me, I criticise you. I don’t find the need to apologise. It is a new policy. 
 
Y: So, do you think the demise in policy is linked to the Flotilla raid or are there 
other things exacerbating the situation? 
 
I: I think the main thing is the Israeli-Arab conflict with a focus on the Israeli-
Palestinian. Let’s say that tomorrow we sit with the Palestinians and we sign 
an agreement with the Fatah and the Hamas for establishing a Palestinian 
state. I’m almost sure that Turkey will almost forget the Flotilla and will give 
the blessing maybe returning the ambassador and so on. On the other hand if 
we would apologise for the Flotilla, even if we returned the ambassador, they 
would not turn the relations back to normal. Unless we move ahead with the 
Palestinians. So, it is connected. I see the Mavi Marmara as a bilateral issue, 
as a hurdle that they will be very, very happy if we can put aside. I believe that 
if we would apologise tomorrow, and we will not, the ambassador would 
come back but the love story that we had in the 90s would need to wait for a 
break through. 
 
Y: Do you think the relationship is over, or that it will progress back to normal? 
 
I: Not unless something dramatic happens. 
 
Y: So there is nothing economically that will push the relationship? 
 
I: Economics has nothing to do with it. There is one factor that can be important 
and can work both ways and this is the gas that we discovered and that Cyprus 
discovered. It can be a source of additional conflict but on the other hand it 
can also, if we play it cleverly, it can also be a tool to improve relations. There 
is another big issue. It is Erdogan; he is sick now. Sick and I don’t know for 
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how long he will be around. I don’t think he can be political into the 
foreseeable future, but I don’t know about his health so if Erdogan is leaving 
the scene then we might have another Turkish leadership which can also bring 
up changes and you know this region is a crazy region and politics is very 
dynamic and we could have another leadership here in a year that will decide 
to apologise or will decide to sign an agreement with the Palestinians. These 
are al things that can happen so I know there will be ups and downs but this I 
see as the key factors for the ups and downs.  
 
Y: When Erdogan says the Flotilla raid was state terrorism, what do you say to 
that? 
 
I: Look, he started using this term three days after he was elected. On the 6th 
November 2002, he already said the Israeli policy was state terrorism. Sharon 
was the Prime Minister and that Sharon was practicing state terrorism. Three 
days after he was elected, he repeated it very often in March and April 2004 
when we killed Abdulaziz al-Rantisi. So you see, he uses this term for years 
now and this is how he really sees it. He thinks that what we call terrorism of 
the Hamas is not terrorism and that this is a legitimate party who won 
elections in 2006, like he won elections. He sees them as freedom fighters and 
not a state with terrorism and Israeli is a state that can do anything it wants 
and you cannot call it terrorism because it is a state so he uses the term state 
terrorism often, he believes in it and he’s not the only one in the world. You 
know we had this report on the War in Gaza three years ago that says Israel 
was breaking international laws and even committing war crimes and he is not 
the only one but usually it does not come from heads of states, definitely not 
heads of states that are associated with the West, usually it comes from Arab 
countries that have no diplomatic relations with us for media, so it is very 
unusual as heads of state that they are attacking Israel in such a way but this is 
what he believes… 
 
There was this incident of sitting the Turkish ambassador on a lower sofa- you 
know what I’m speaking about? 
 
Y: Yes… 
 
I: This was a big thing; a very big thing and you should cover it and examine it 
at least a little bit. Also, you should examine more about the flotilla; I mean 
how did it happen that Israel couldn’t handle it without killing these people 
and so on. There is this report of the UN committee but the issue of insulting 
the Turkish ambassador was part of this policy of retaliating. Prior to it, there 
were television series in Turkey that were very critical of Israel so they 
summoned the Turkish ambassador and they wanted to humiliate him. They 
didn’t want to just protest, the minister felt that this was a useless type of 
routine (protesting) and that we were being attacked and we protest…no he 
wanted to retaliate. The deputy minister thought he had a very creative idea 
and he would insult the ambassador and it was done in a very foolish way. 
What we discovered was that not only our minister’s honour but also that the 
Turks are very sensitive when it comes to their national honour and they fired 
this ambassador, they took him out of here.  
	   96	  
 
 So the Turks, they fired him. They didn’t fire him from the ministry but they 
pulled him back because they said, if they insulted you in such a way, why 
didn’t you leave? And he said, they didn’t insult me, it was just a spiel after I 
left, I don’t feel insulted. But, they couldn’t keep him here because they had to 
do something about the pride of the Turkish nation, and this guy, by the way, 
is the ambassador to Thailand today or something. 
 
Y:  How closely linked do you feel the Flotilla was to this T.V soap? 
 
I: Everything is linked. As far as I remember, the Flotilla was at the end of May 
2010. When was this incident with the ambassador? 
 
Y: It was after, in September- November 2010. 
 
I: So obviously it is related because of the grievances. 
 
Y:  Why would you speculate that so much force was used in the Flotilla raid and 
what brought it about? 
 
I: This is something…there was an intelligence fort here, because they didn’t 
know how determined these people were. It was very easy to know it. It was a 
mistake. They didn’t follow it as they should have. For instance, it was very 
easy to see what was going on the boat- it was the IHH site, I saw it in my 
home and they were not monitoring it. I think the Israeli army was so used to 
seeing Turkey as a threating country they didn’t grasp how drastically things 
had turned around and they didn’t prepare themselves and they should have. 
The Israeli army could have handled it in many other ways. Many other ways. 
 
Y: Why did they do it this way then, was it purposeful? 
 
I: No, they probably thought this is the best unit we have in the army and these 
are the best soldiers we have in the IDF and probably the best in the world 
also. They thought they could handle it and it was something they couldn’t 
handle. Their position was fierce and the people were determined and they 
didn’t assess correctly and because with the other boats, in the Flotilla there 
were several, there was no problem at all. There was no opposition, violent 
opposition, and they thought it was going to be the same with all of them and 
they made a very big mistake. But, it’s not that the soldiers misbehaved. They 
had to do it because it would cost them their lives. They were sent on an 
impossible mission. The Israeli expectation was no casualties and everybody 
knew that if there were casualties it would be a big story. It was a mistake. The 
Prime Minister, by the way, was abroad, and the top military leadership were 
sleeping and the guy who ended it was the head of the navy, if he was awake, I 
don’t know.  They didn’t read it as seriously as it should have been read. 
 
Y: Why was there such a big conflict on just one of the ships? How did this come 
about? 
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I: First of all, this ship had six hundred people. The others had tens, dozens, I 
don’t know. It was a big ship. Also, it was the IHH, it was Islamic militants 
and when there are so many people and so many journalists, by the way, they 
couldn’t prevent the broadcasting and they wanted to kick up a show and a 
fight. They should have known much better and with the Israeli sophistication 
we do unbelievable things. For instance, in the following year we prevented 
the Flotilla, we blocked it when they were Cyprus, in Greece. It wasn’t dealt 
with as it should have been but it was not something that was done 
intentionally, it was not a mistake of the soldiers themselves. They tried not to 
shoot as much as they could but it was an intelligence fault.  
 
Y: Thank you for your time 
 
Interview terminated at 16:41 
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Appendix B3:  
Transcript: Alex Yakobson Interview 11th January 2012 
 
Location: Jerusalem, Israel 
Date: 11/01/12 
Interviewer: Katherine Cook (Y) 
Interviewee: Alex Yakobson (I) 
 
Interview commenced 15:30  
 
Y:  How would you describe the current relationship between Israel and Turkey? 
 
I:  I think that basically, my assessment is that this present government in Turkey 
really made a strategic decision to get out of the Turkish-Israeli 
alliance/friendship that existed. To put an end to it because in any case it 
didn’t fit their strategic and ideological worldview. IT doesn’t fit into their 
whole system of foreign relations. Turkey is getting away form the West. It 
doesn’t rupture relations with the West, but it’s not any longer a close ally of 
the United States and the West and it positions itself as the leading force in the 
Muslim World, a kind of model in the Muslim World. It’s not the most radical 
variant of what’s going on in the Muslim world but it is certainly…it’s game is 
to win in the Muslim world and as a leading force and as a moral authority in 
the Muslim world it cannot be perceived as a close ally of Israel. That is in any 
case incompatible with their general posture, general stance and so relations 
with Israel had to be sacrificed one way or another and so I think it was a 
deliberate decision. It was carried out by a series of provocations by 
worsening of rhetoric by aggressive and very insulting rhetoric on all kinds of 
occasions and sure we have also contributed. We have made it easier for them 
on certain occasions the most notable of course is this infamous incident with 
the ambassador but basically I don’t think it made it easier for Erdogan to 
claim. He made good use of it, but I don’t think it would have made much of a 
difference. In any case, when someone decides to quarrel with you, it is very 
difficult not to contribute to the quarrel and most people know that if someone 
is really determined to quarrel then that’s it. That doesn’t of course excuse this 
incident specifically, which was a total disgrace of course, from the diplomatic 
point of view. By the way, I have to note that I used to work in a room in the 
Knesset that is like the one in which the incident took place and I can tell you 
that there was no…The Turkish ambassador was not put on a lower chair. This 
is not only the sofa in which he sat was the normal one in that room but also 
the table that he was facing, nothing happened. What happened was that the 
deputy foreign minister said to journalists, take note that he is below and I am 
upstairs. But of course that saying in itself was an act. A speech act. By saying 
that he made it into a diplomatic insult, which of course was totally wrong and 
stupid and so that was used but that was not a reason for anything, nor in fact 
was the deplorable incident with the Marmara in which there was a very 
deliberate Turkish provocation by the organisers and by the government, I’m 
quite sure.  But, the whole thing was handled very poorly by the Israeli navy- 
unprofessionally. But, I don’t think there was any desire on anybody’s part to 
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kill Turks. It’s obvious when you see the pictures that the soldiers, when they 
started firing, when they really were in distress and were in danger. Now, it 
was a very silly operation plan that put them in such a situation, so they should 
have of course, done everything to avoid exactly this situation. Of course it 
made things worse when people get killed, form the viewpoint of the Turkish 
public opinion, including those who don’t like Erdogan at all, I mean for them, 
that is very significant and so that is a problem that will probably influence 
relations with Turkey even if there is a change in government and a change in 
course. But, for this government it wasn’t something that was…it was a 
pretext again, so they just decided to…they couldn’t…if you analyse the 
whole Turkish foreign policy as it is right now and you ask yourself was it 
feasible for Turkey to continue being friends with Israel then the answer is no, 
of course not. What ever the government in Israel is and whatever it does. 
 
Y: So do you think the conflict has arisen out of Turkey’s ambition to break away 
from the West? 
 
I: Not just to break away from the West, but to become a regional power, whose 
influence rests on the fact that it’s a Muslim power and an object of admiration 
of a certain section of the Muslim public opinion. Let’s say Muslim, but not 
fundamentalist. The Muslim brothers do not like even this type of Turkey and 
certainly not Ataturk’s type of Turkey. I don’t suppose they really…the 
Muslim brothers are too Muslim for them and the Mubarak regime was not 
enough Muslim for them but I’m not sure how far they will actually succeed 
and I don’t know if the Arab Spring is producing the kind of regimes…but 
maybe. For example, it is conceivable that the Muslim brothers will decide 
that they accept them for pragmatic reasons because it is still a Muslim 
government. But that was their idea. 
 
Y:  Will Israel need Turkey if it becomes a strong regional power? 
 
I: Well, Israel always needs good relations with important regional countries and 
Turkey is a very important country. Interestingly, the economic relations are 
only improving because up to now it’s just business as usual, in the economics 
sphere. In the military sphere it’s not like this and Israel has just cancelled an 
important military order because the Israeli government is now afraid to sell 
sensitive military information and military equipment to Turkey for fear that it 
might get into the wrong hands. But strictly from the economic point of view, 
nothing has happened. 
 
Y: In this way, militaristically, does Turkey need Israel more than Israel needs 
Turkey? 
 
I: I’m not an expert on that at all. In order to give you a serious answer you 
would need someone who I’m not sure would be willing to talk. But, from my 
superficial impression, if you ask about equipment of course Turkey needs 
Israel more than we need Turks, but what we need from them is I guess 
geography. The physical access to certain places and the space the air space. 
For that we are now being compensated in some way by our new allies, 
including those who like us precisely because we have a quarrel with the 
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Turks, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. So, the Israeli air force, it’s not a secret 
that it used to train in the Turkish air space because Israel is just too small and 
the Israeli air force cannot train seriously in Israel so we need this. We did it 
for many years above in the Turkish skies and this is off now so, but we are 
doing it in other European places so how or whether this is crucial, I’m not 
sure. But, I suspect that there should be some things that are connected with 
Turkey being physically close to certain sensitive places. I could guess that 
there could be some physical intelligence, some collection of information from 
Turkish territory… I wouldn’t be surprised if there were intelligence 
corporations between Turkey and Israel and these things are conceivable 
damaging to Israel.  
 
Y: How do you speculate the relationship is going to develop over the next year 
to few years? 
 
I: It depends what happens in Turkey. The Israeli government is of course wants 
to have, at least doesn’t want to have these relations totally ruined now, 
because there were threats already to break diplomatic relations and to impose 
economic sanctions but we haven’t seen that yet so perhaps Turkey will 
decide, this government will decide, that they’ve quarreled enough with us and 
Erdogan is not Chavez, he is not openly anti-American. So, a total break with 
Israel would be considered in America as a sure sign that you are a kind of 
going into the axis of evil almost. So, perhaps there will be some limit to, but 
there is no going back to the old relations unless there is a very deep change 
and that is not a change only of policy, I don’t believe that under government 
that this is in any way possible and who knows what happens in Turkey. I hear 
for example that the economic situation in Turkey is potentially a serious 
threat, and I have no idea if this is so, if there is a serious economic 
crisis…Turkey is a functioning democracy, an electoral democracy- the 
governments are elected. But, I think to have a real improvement in the 
relations, what it would take is a new government, a new direction.  
 
Y: Turkey is currently demanding an apology from Israel over the Flotilla raid 
and the UN’s findings. Do you think that Israel owes Turkey an apology? 
 
I: The UN findings do not justify an apology but they (Turkey) attack the UN 
findings. It is not often that we find ourselves to some considerable degree, 
justified by the UN enquiry. I think the Israeli government offered an 
explanation and expression of regret and compensation for families for 
humanitarian conservation and I think this is as far as it is willing to go and I 
think it is quite a reasonable position. They are not refusing all flexibility, I 
frankly think that if the assessment were to be Israeli sided, this is really what 
stands between us and the real improvement of relations then they would 
perhaps have been willing to go even so far as apologising, finding some 
creative form. Obviously I think the Israeli assessment was, and I think it was 
the right one, this was not about it. So, there is no need, no sense in 
apologising when really if there is any government that directly bears direct 
responsibility for this it is the Turkish government not the Israeli government. 
I repeat it was a badly, mismanaged military operation and the results are 
tragic because of the loss of life and so in a situation like that you do express 
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regret but the soldiers were obviously in mortal danger and I don’t think 
anyone attacking Turkish soldiers in this way would have got away with it. 
But, in some future if there is a Turkish government that is basically willing to 
improve relations and it has to get something because it is a matter of pride 
or…I think they will work out some kind of forum. 
 
Y: What events do you believe led to the Flotilla incident? Do you think the 
supposed insult on the Ambassador contributed? 
 
I: No, they had been talking about breaking the blockade of Gaza for a long 
time, Erdogan even threatened to go to Gaza and that was a very effective way 
of making their point. The UN in the meantime actually said the blockade was 
legal, and the whole Turkish rhetoric totally ignores the fact that Gaza is 
controlled by people who openly deny Israel’s right to exist and that rockets 
are fired before the operation of Gaza on a regular basis, now more seldom. 
The whole blockade thing is also crazy because actually there has never been a 
blockade of Gaza in the proper sense because Gaza has a border with Egypt 
and it is true that the Mubarak government was in itself kind of cooperating 
with the Israeli blockade but if I were a Muslim politician in a Muslim country 
and I cared about Gaza and if I wanted to make the point to my pubic opinion 
that I cared about Gaza then the logical thing is to ask the Egyptian 
government to allow the passing of whatever they wanted to get to Gaza. 
Whatever they wanted to get to Gaza it’s easier to approach the Egyptian 
government and other Arab and Muslim governments and say well we have 
these innocent, non-military things and allow us to do that. Israel doesn’t 
control the border between Gaza and Egypt so why not ask the Egyptians and 
then put pressure on them if they refuse to allow something which is 
dangerous in their view and sometimes there are disputes over what can be 
used militarily and what can’t be, but, the whole argument about what should 
be allowed and what should not be allowed, should have been conducted 
between Turkey and the government of an Arab and Muslim country that has a 
border with Gaza which we don’t control.  The claim that Israel is occupying 
Gaza is crazy. There is a blockade there, a naval blockade because there is a 
very reasonable apprehension that things are, and I’m sure military things are 
getting to Gaza, but Turkey didn’t have to get into any trouble with us or any 
problem. They have, at least with Egypt, they had a quarrel with Egypt and so 
I mean if someone really wants to help the people of Gaza, the obvious thing 
to do, and I’m not talking about some group that takes a boat (the Mavi 
Marmara), I’m talking about a country that is large and strong enough to get 
things done and if there is a border and Egypt is controlling it then obviously 
there was a provocation to provoke. 
 
Y: Do you think Egypt and the Arab Spring has influenced the demise in relations 
between Israel and Turkey? 
 
I: It’s interesting- I don’t get it exactly. What is the Turkish take on the Arab 
Spring now? Obviously they regarded the Arab Spring as something very 
promising when it started. I guess, I’m not sure about it, I’m just guessing, but 
it wouldn’t surprise me if they thought that the Arab Spring would produce a 
government in Egypt and in other places that was more responsive to public 
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opinion and less so Muslim. Inevitably in countries like that and so they, in 
that sense, they were very encouraged by the Arab Spring and of course 
Turkey can claim to be a functioning Muslim democracy. I also wouldn’t be 
surprised if this thing succeeded too much because I’m not sure they bargained 
for a Muslim brotherhood dominated government. This also depends on who I 
suspect Erdogan actual is, I mean how Muslim, how Islamist is he? Some 
people don’t really believe there is any difference between Erdogan and the 
Muslim brothers but I’m not sure of that. I think he’s too Islamist for many 
people’s comfort, but he’s not necessarily all the way like the Muslim 
brothers. So maybe they are kind of disappointed, I wouldn’t be surprised if 
they were. In Syria, they are now helping the opposition and that is interesting 
because I think with Syria they improved relations with Erdogan at some point 
but it’s Assad’s Alawis but I think with this massacre of the Sunni’s by an 
Alawite regime is too much for the Turkish government and public opinion to 
take, so they had to…now they are supporting the opposition, they are actually 
in the certain sense now the enemy of our enemy because again Israel is very 
ambivalent on what is happening in Syria because on the one hand the Syrian 
regime is really very nasty and not just nasty as a regime but because of its 
cooperation with Iran and Hezbollah it is a very dangerous regime. On the 
other hand, what will come after it, I don’t know. 
 
Y: Have you noticed any particular patterns in addition to the continuous demise 
in relations under the Erdogan period of reign from 2003 to now or has it been 
a steady decline in relations? 
 
I: There must have been ups and downs also as long as the army had some 
influence obviously in the first year of Erdogan, the Turkish army still had 
considerable influence, so in military fields there was very intensive 
cooperation and I was in Turkey and someone told me it’s all a joke, 
everybody knows it that the Israeli air forces are training here- that base over 
there everyone knows. But in the mean time things happen with the Turkish 
army. So, I think now it seems that there was…Israeli-Turkish relations never 
had a chance under Erdogan. 
 
Y:  The Israeli Prime Minister’s office said they wished to restore relations but 
they refuse to apologise, do you think any resolution will be sought? 
 
I: I think they stopped just short of actually apologising. They were willing to do 
all sorts of things that come very close to it and the reason why they didn’t go 
another additional step in explicitly apologising is the assessment that it 
wouldn’t help actually. So you just demean yourself and deliver another 
propaganda coup another achievement to Erdogan because he was very 
anxious to get it. Not because that would cause him to change it, I don’t 
believe that. In any case we cannot know that for sure but I suppose that was 
the decisive consideration and in the cabinet they would know there are 
different answers but I think that he (Benjamin Netanyahu) thought that it 
wouldn’t really change anything and I suspect he was right. 
 
Y: After the Flotilla Raid, Erdogan described it as a form of State Terrorism on 
Israel’s part, what do you think of this? 
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I: The UN investigation said that the naval blockade of Gaza was legal because 
of the threat from Gaza against Israel and the actual military attacks and if you 
try to break a legal naval blockade then strictly speaking, as far as I know 
under international law, a ship that refuses to stop when it is breaking a naval 
blockade you are allowed to sink it. Now, I think that nobody today would 
dare to do such a thing and you always have to think about the loss of life and 
not everyone on board that ship was an Islamist activist. All kinds of useful 
idiots from Europe who are no reason to kill people, they are silly… but the 
UN again said that the investigation that the use of force itself was legal and 
the soldiers were in danger but they also said it was excessive force. Excessive 
force you could say that the bottom line is that people got killed and a 
sovereign state should have had the chance to find an alternative way of 
dealing with it. In so far as this is the criticism, I think it is a fair criticism. I 
think that if you ask whether the state of Israel should have found a way of 
dealing with it without killing people or so many people but I don’t think there 
was anyone who was trigger happy, when you see these pictures it’s not a 
matter of them being trigger happy, it’s a very badly mismanaged operation- 
for some reason they assumed that they were facing demonstrators and so 
what they came down with actually were these colour balls, those silly things 
which are only effective against people who are at worst they violate public 
order. But then if when they attack you in such a vicious way and you have 
your weapons with you then you use your weapons. The piracy is something 
else, I think. Piracy, by the way, is not when you defend yourself and use 
excessive force that is not piracy. Piracy is not excessive force.  
 
Y: Overall, do you believe that Israel stands to gain more than it stands to lose if 
relations are restored? 
 
I: Sure, I think that nobody in Israel wants or ever wanted to quarrel with 
Turkey. I mean as a matter of national interest, Israeli tradition, we don’t have 
any issues between Israel and Turkey. Historically, it is usually said that there 
is a story of relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Jewish people 
which are relatively benign and there is no reason, no historical reasons but 
above all of course, there are no political reasons to quarrel with Turkey and in 
any case, Israel is not in a position to initiate a quarrel with anybody, certainly 
not an important country and everybody understands that Turkey is a very 
important country. I’m sure the Israeli government would be quite happy to, 
even if it’s not a question of going all the way back to the old relations, which 
is not feasible, but to improve those relations somewhat, they would welcome 
that, of course.  
 
Y: So do you think that Israel needs Turkey as a strategic alliance in the region? 
 
I: Yes, we need Turkey in the sense that it’s useful for us to have Turkey as an 
ally certainly, but whether it’s disastrous for us not to have it as an ally, I don’t 
know. It could be worse than I know because if there are come specific 
military intelligence that I’m not aware of then there could be some very 
sensitive things which could depend on Turkish cooperation- it’s not 
impossible. It is not my impression that this is a disaster, but it certainly is a 
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set back, it’s bad for the country. I don’t think anyone doubts it. For example, 
the Syrian reactor, the nuclear reactor that was allegedly bombed by the Israeli 
air force, I don’t think there is much doubt nowadays that we did it, I think it 
was very…the Israeli government managed to shut up and not to brag about it, 
it’s very commendable but we all assume it was Israeli air force. It seems that 
they some how entered, on their way to Syria, they entered the Turkish 
airspace and I guess it wouldn’t be possible now, so that could have…at that 
point it was still possible but now it wouldn’t be possible, that could 
conceivably have very serious drawbacks. I hope we won’t have to fly in that 
direction any time soon, especially if Assad’s regime falls, then the next 
government in Syria will be busy with other things, but who knows. It could 
be very serious but if worst comes to worst I suppose the Israeli force could 
fly over Turkey but that can also have…it’s not something that anyone 
relishes, the prospect of such a thing so I don’t suppose there is any option for 
that now. That’s a problem.  
 
Y: Thank you for your time 
 
Interview terminated at 13:57 
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Appendix B4:  
Transcript: Efraim Inbar Interview, 12th January 2012 
 
Location: Jerusalem, Israel 
Date: 12/01/12 
Interviewer: Katherine Cook (Y) 
Interviewee: Efraim Inbar (I) 
 
 
Interview commenced 08:10  
 
 
Y:  How would you describe the current relationship between Israel and Turkey? 
 
I:  Very cool.  
 
Y: How would you say it’s gone downhill since the Flotilla Raid? 
 
I: I think there is no longer any military cooperation; we stopped selling 
weapons to them and there are a lot of anti-Israeli statements coming from 
Turkey. They are continuing cooperation with Iran and not participating in the 
international sanctions. Those are things that we do not appreciate. 
 
Y: How do you relate this to Erdogan’s rule? Do you think this pattern would 
have continued if Turkey were under a different leadership? 
 
I: No, I think that the current Islamic corporation of the government is partly 
responsible, or largely responsible for the anti-Israeli attitude and the courting 
of Iran and the courting of other Islamic groups in the Middle East, supporting 
the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt and Syria of course.  
 
Y:  Do you think the relationship between Israel and Turkey is important and 
crucial? 
 
I: For Israel it’s a very important relationship because it’s a big loss as far as 
Israel’s concerned the distancing of Turkey from the West. Turkey is an 
important country, a strong country and it is a pity that we don’t have good 
relations with Turkey. We are hurt strategically.  
 
Y: Would you say that Israel needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Israel? 
 
I: Yes. We are a small country and they are a large one. They can afford 
estranging Israel, they don’t pay much of a price, even with the Americans, 
with a misguided foreign policy anyway. With this administration in particular 
so yes, the Turks get away with this type of anti-Israeli policies. 
 
Y: Do you think that the relationship would have still deteriorated without the 
Flotilla Raid? 
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I: The Flotilla Raid was basically a Turkish provocation of Israel and we fell into 
the trap. We didn’t handle it right but it was probably inevitable. 
 
Y: The UN found that Israel had acted lawfully, yet Turkey still demands an 
apology from Israel. Do you think that Israel owes Turkey an apology? 
I: No, they owe us an apology. They put IHH people on the boat as a clear anti-
Israeli, you know, it’s a group of terrorists. They should respect our right to 
impose a blockade on Hamas and the mere fact that they are getting close to 
Hamas is an anti-Israeli move. 
 
Y: So do you think that perhaps the Flotilla was set up? 
 
I: I don’t know the exact details of how the Flotilla happened, but it was clearly 
something that was planned and also by the government. IT was not just an 
NGO operating independently of the government and it was a provocation of 
Israel, definitely.  
 
Y: How do you see the relationship progressing in the near future? 
 
I: I don’t think they are going to progress any way with this government in 
place, with Erdogan. If there was a different government maybe we’ll see a 
different policy because I think there are large parts of the Turkish 
establishment that wants good relations with Israel and there is sympathy for 
Israel in Turkish public opinion. 
 
Y: How would you describe the pattern of relations between Turkey and Israel 
since 2003? 
 
I: For a while business was as usual. In recent years the relationship deteriorated. 
 
Y: What do you believe is Erdogan’s motive in creating such bad relations 
between Israel and Turkey? 
 
I: It’s a change in the strategic environment of Turkey. Also, of course, Islamic 
motivation in getting closer to the Muslim world.  
 
Y: Yes, I’ve read your articles, which argue that Turkey is trying to forge 
stronger ties with the Muslim world and break away from the West, why 
would they do this? 
 
I: Because there is a change in government thinking. They are trying to play an 
important role in the Middle East, which is a departure from Turkish polices. 
In order to play the leadership role in this area they need to distance 
themselves from Israel because Israel is not very popular with the Muslims. 
 
Y: To what extent do you think Egypt and the Arab Spring have contributed to 
Turkey’s actions? 
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I: I think that the Arab Spring has confirmed that Turkey became more Islamist 
because they were supporting changes against the poor Western government. 
They welcomed the Muslim brotherhood, they are actively supporting the 
Muslim brotherhood opposition in Syria because it weakens the Arabs and 
also it brings into power groups that have similar Islamic outlooks. 
 
Y: With this loss of strategic alliance with Turkey, what will this mean for Israel 
as Egypt and Turkey rise in power? 
 
I: It means that we are more isolated in the region and it means that we will have 
more security problems but we are a strong country and we will manage.  
 
Y: How much do you believe economics has contributed to the relationship? 
 
I:  The economics so far have been insulated from the political and as long as 
businessmen continue to make money and profit from the bilateral relationship 
and as long as the government of Turkey will not interfere with the economic 
relationship. There was recently an increase in economic relations. 
 
Y: So you don’t feel the political tensions will affect this economic relationship? 
 
I: So far it hasn’t affected it and obviously Israel has no interest in allowing the 
political atmosphere to affect the bilateral economic relations.  
 
Y: How much do you think Turkey needs Israel? 
 
I: Israel is to some extent dispensable but Turkey still needs Israeli technology, 
Israeli connections to the US but it’s a question of trade offs, what they prefer 
more in the Middle East; to be seen as an anti-Israeli force and so far the price 
they have paid for this posture is very limited. 
 
Y: Immediately after the Flotilla Raid, Erdogan described the event as State 
terrorism, what do you speculate he meant by this, was it part of the stunt? 
 
I: Of course, it’s an attempt to denigrate Israel. We don’t tell him how to treat 
the Kurds and I don’t think he should tell us how to treat our enemies. 
 
Y: Immediately after this, the Israeli Prime Minister’s office released a statement 
saying they hoped to find a way to overcome the disputes and will continue to 
work towards that goal. How would you describe the reaction; have they made 
an effort to restore relations? 
 
I: Yes, I think there were attempts, particularly from the minister of defense but 
they were not successful. Turkish demands for an apology were impossible to 
meet despite the fact that we suggested several other formulas, Israel was even 
willing to pay compensation to the families of the people killed on the 
Marmara, but from my perspective, Turkey was looking for a confrontation.  
 
Y: Why do you believe so much force was used on the Flotilla Raid? 
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I: It was necessary for self-defense; I don’t think there was much force used. 
They could have shot the whole boat and sank it. I think it was very measured 
force in order for self-defense after the commanders came in with paint balls. I 
think it’s ludicrous to accuse Israel of exaggerated use of force. It was for self-
defense. 
 
Y:  Moving away from this, historically, how do you think Israel has gained from 
Turkey aside from being a strategic alliance? 
 
I: I think at the economic level of course it’s a small market but still it’s a market 
for Israeli products. Again, Turkey is an important country and we want to 
have good relations with particularly Muslim countries and Turkey’s Muslim 
identity was important to us, to dilute the religious component of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. 
 
Y: Once the Erdogan government is out, what do you think the chances are of a 
restored relationship? 
 
I: It depends if his party stays in control or not. He probably wants to move to 
presidency an he tries to change the system into a more presidential system in 
Turkey and so if he stays in a different role I think there will not be much 
change in Israeli-Turkey relations, but, if another party comes to power we 
may see an improvement in Israeli-Turkish relations.  
 
Y: Do you think that if the new power does come to power in Turkey, do you 
think that the conflicts in Egypt are going to influence the prospects of 
relations between Israel and Turkey? 
 
I: Well, in the past, Turkey was able to have bilateral relations without the 
influence of the vagaries of the Arab-Israeli conflict and I see no reason why it 
cannot come back to bilateral relations which are insulated from the rest of the 
processes in the Middle East 
 
Y:  Strategically, if Israeli is without Turkey who would you think Israeli is now 
likely to turn to? 
 
I: I think we’ve done our share in forging alternative relations with Greece, 
Cyprus, Romani and southern Sudan, a new state. Maybe we’ll see more of an 
Israeli effort towards the Kurds and the Gulf states, there are other options in 
Saudi Arabia, which is very much against Iraq, and we’ll see a new balance of 
power. 
 
Y: Do you think that is perhaps one of the mentalities in the Israeli government 
not apologising was to restore some sense of balance of power between 
Turkey and Israel?  
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I: No, I think, and I was to some extent involved in, with a very limited role in 
the process, but the issue was not national honour, it was simply a pragmatic 
assessment, whether and apology would indeed bring about a change in 
Turkish policy. I think the Israeli policy decision makers, at least most of 
them, reached the conclusion that an apology would be ineffective and 
therefore, superfluous.  
 
Y: Thank you for your time. 
 
Interview terminated 08:30 
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Appendix C2:  
Transcript: Denis Taniz Interview, 5th July 2012 
 
Location: Istanbul, Turkey 
Date: 05/07/12 
Interviewer: Katherine Cook (Y) 
Interviewee: Denis Taniz (I) 
 
Interview commenced 17:00  
 
Y:  You are an expert on relations between Turkey and Israel, how would you 
describe the current relationship between Turkey and Israel? 
 
I:  First of all you must understand the general structure of Turkish-Israeli 
relations because it is unique. Why I say unique, for instance you can say that 
both of the countries have not an alliance level, but they are not enemies. 
Instead of allies we can say alliance because there is a triangle. This triangle’s 
name is Turkish-Israeli relationship and you can ask the Turkish corner of this 
triangle, which is of course the United States of America. The United States of 
America is the main determinant for the Turkish-Israeli relationship and if you 
focus on the Middle East, we can see many countries such as Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar, they have alliances with the United States of America. But Turkey’s 
position is very different because it is a member of NATO also Turkey is a 
member of the European Council and Turkey is in the UN accession process 
and why Turkish-Israeli relations are very different and very separated we 
must understand. You are asking the current relationship of Turkish-Israeli 
relations. We can say that first of all in 2009 a General in Davos 
(Switzerland), the Turkish PM challenged David Ignatius, he was a moderator 
of the meeting here in Davos. There was a panel and also Israeli President 
Shimon Peres was there and we must analyse Turkish behaviour. For instance, 
in 2009, it was very interesting behaviours from Turkey to Israel. First of all, 
the Turkish PM challenged. Why? Israel’s operation together in this December 
2008 and January 2009 in Operation Cast Lead, after Operation Cast Lead. 
But, Israel attacked the Palestinians or Gaza or the West Bank several times. 
But in 2009, and Erdogan became Prime Minister in 2003, he came to rule of 
Turkey in 2002 and Erdogan became Prime Minister in 2003 but he 
challenged in 2009. So, we must understand moderate Islam approach or the 
Neo-Ottoman Empire. After 2009, for instance, in October 2009, Turkey 
disqualified Israel from the military drill, Anatolian Eagle. It was an 
international military drill but after Turkey’s behaviour for instance the United 
Kingdom and the United Stated withdrew from the drill and it became 
national. After, there was a Turkish TV series, TST (Turkish State Television) 
about why Israel condemned Turkey because Turkish TV shot Israeli soldiers 
as baby killers. But, for instance in the same month in October 2009, we were 
in Israel, in the Turkish embassy in Tel Aviv and after, in 2010 we had a 
crisis. With Danny Ayalon, the Turkish ambassador he made a challenge to 
the Turkish ambassador but the most important problem was the Mavi 
Marmara. The Mavi Marmara did not belong to Turkey but Turkish citizens 
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were there and they were challenging about Gaza and to disqualify Israel in 
the Gaza strip and after this situation, Turkey-Israeli relations became even 
more fragile. But, first of all we must understand the process from 2009, it was 
a combination.  
 
Y: So you have brought up Erdogan coming into power in 2003, do you see that 
there’s been a specific shift in relations under this power change since 2003? 
 
I: For instance, he has visited Israel in 2005, there was no problem but the 
AKP’s rule on Turkey has had some moderate change, you could say neo-
Ottoman. But we can say it is a sub-contraction for Turkey because the United 
States sometimes tries some, not ideological, but some doctrinal approach to 
the Middle East. For instance, today, Obama’s administration is trying to 
influence the Middle East with Aswan in Egypt, or in the moderate Sunni 
countries. Also, they tried Turkey as a sample, to make a model to the Middle 
East and if for instance the United States tries with any country, a model to the 
Middle East, in quotation marks, you must challenge to Israel because Israel is 
a very productive tool, end quotation mark, for challenging to the Middle East 
or being a Middle Eastern leader. Why the AKP, or ruling party, has this 
agenda in this moment, so why Turkey has problems, but if we get attention, 
like last month we do not speak on Turkish-Israeli relations, we speak 
generally on the Turkish-Syrian crisis. Turkish foreign policy’s agenda is 
parallel with the United States. So, the United States’ agenda is today Syria. 
You can ask that to the United States and Israel are allies or they have a 
strategic partnership but there is a problem with the Obama administration and 
the Netanyahu governments. Not a problem between the states but between the 
states. I think that is reflects the Turkish-Israeli relationship often. 
 
Y: Do you believe the breakdown in relations is partly due to the AKP’s agenda 
to realign Turkey with the Middle East? 
 
I: I think the main problem for the AKP is the agenda that changed rapidly. So, 
the AKP is trying to adapt the agenda for the current relations. Today, we can 
say that the main problem for the United States is Iran and Iran-Syria relations 
and the Lebanese situation. But, what is the distinctive point for Israel? 
Honestly, I can say that Turkey and Israel, today for current relations, they are 
not enemies but there is a very interesting relationship from 1949. Many Arab 
countries suppose that Turkey and Israel have problems in front of the cameras 
this is right. But, behind the cameras there is a very different relationship and a 
very different agenda for Turkey-Israeli relations, this is why I say the 
triangle. Erdogan’s charisma or Erdogan’s Islamic discourse needs an anti-
Israel approach. The scenario sustains to which points and to which dates. It 
depends on the conjuncture and for instance, Israel’s administration, also, is 
being disturbed by Syrian dictatorship, Assad. Turkey’s challenge to Assad, 
when we describe international relations, we underlined the benefits, not the 
sustainable friendship, only the benefits. So, what’s the common benefit for 
Turkey and Israel, on Syria for instance, or what’s the difference for Turkish-
Iranian relations and Turkish-Israeli relations. When we put the project on this 
relationship, I think it must be studied in the historical process. 
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Y: The media portrays almost the entire breakdown as resultant of the Mavi 
Marmara incident in 2010. Do you think that this is perhaps this realigning 
with relations that has caused this divergence away from Israel? 
 
I: I think the main problem was not the foreign policy. The main problem for the 
AKP was about domestic policy. The AKP is constructing its hegemony in 
Turkey with, for instance the Mavi Marmara. The Mavi Marmara has an 
influence on the Turkish domestic policy and Turkish public opinion. The 
AKP captured the agenda with Mavi Marmara. But I can say that, for instance, 
none of the AKP members, MPs got on the Mavi Marmara ship. Mavi 
Marmara is the main point for the Turkish-Israeli relationship. I think it must 
be questioned because Mavi Marmara was the outcome for the short time, 
what I have emphasised from 2009-2010 and Turkey for instance did not 
support the report from the United Nations Human Rights Commission in 
Switzerland but Turkey received Palmer reports in the United Nations but in 
the Switzerland reports, Turkey had advantages about the Mavi Marmara, but 
with New York support, we can say that Turkey had disadvantages and the 
Palmer report supported Israel. Turkey withdrew because of the problem about 
killed Turkish citizens. Why, I do not know but it is not being declared to 
Turkish Public opinion. Nobody is questioning this process, this is what I 
think is interesting for studying Turkish foreign policy or Turkish-Israeli 
relations or Turkey’s approach to Israel.  
 
Y: On this change of public opinion, do you think that Erdogan and the AKP are 
using a change in Turkish opinion to move away from Israel? 
 
I: That is right because instead of Turkish national identity, Muslim identity or 
Sunni identity, Sunni is a sector in the Muslim religion, why? Because, this is 
the right point, because if we underline Gramsci’s hegemony theory, we can 
understand the situation. Unfortunately, in Turkey, not only the Islamist 
approach, some nationalist approaches have anti-semitic discourse. I think this 
is the main problem. Not only anti-semitics, also some approaches to 
Armenians or Greeks or others, but especially the last years there are many 
books, not scientific books, but consecratory and these consecratory books are 
not only on anti-semitics in Israel but Jews in Turkey, Jews in Turkey or Jews 
in the United States. This situation, not only about the AKP, I can underline 
that, nationalist discourse and Islamist discourse feeds the anti-Semitic 
approach and the ruling party is using this anti-Semitic approach to, 
unfortunately, to gain popularity. It can be very productive because in Turkey, 
honestly I can say that there is not an associated anti-Semitic discourse. 
Sometimes in Turkish political history we can see or we can face, but not a 
systematic anti-semitic approach. It was constructed and after this construction 
it was made very productive and Islamism can use the anti-Semitic approach 
very productively. Also, for nationalists, they are not aware of what’s going on 
and they also indirectly feed the anti-Semitic approach. So, when we underline 
Turkish-Israeli relations we do not only mention Turkey and Israel. Also, the 
anti-Semitic approach and hate speech, hate speech in public discourse. It is 
not mandatory for instance to come from the state, it is not mandatory. In 
newspapers, in journals, in public speech- I can give many details about it. So, 
anti-Semitics is the main corner of this policy and when you blame for 
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instance, Israel, also you can blame Jews, in Turkey or in many countries. I 
think the main problem is the hate speech. The hate speech, unfortunately, 
sometimes can determine the policy in front of the cameras, but this is not the 
reality. 
 
Y: Would you agree with the statement that Turkey has realigned itself with a 
Middle Eastern identity and no longer with its European identity? 
 
I: This is the very classical clash in Turkey; are you Middle Eastern or 
European? Officially, Turkey is a candidate for the European Union but I 
especially condemn Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’. I do not agree with 
it because, according to me, there is only one civilisation on Earth, but if he 
divides the world with the religions or the religions with civilisations, there 
could be clashes and it means there could be global conservatism or global 
fighting on the Earth. Turkey’s situation, Turkey is unique. Why? Because 
Turkey is the only secular state in the Middle East and has a Muslim majority 
population. The AKP calls herself not Islamists but calls it a conservative 
democracy, but, many of the observers underline the AKP as a moderate Islam 
or Islamist and so on. This clash in Turkey, I do not mean the weapons, I mean 
culturally, we can see the outcomes in elections in public life. For instance, we 
are in Taksim and there is now no problem, but some regions in Istanbul can 
be made very conservative, or for instance, my region, Kadikoy, is very 
secular but the AKP’s main agenda is Islamism plus hidden nationalism. The 
AKP’s main approach disqualifies [inaudible], not officially, but culturally. 
We can say for instance, in Turkish foreign policy on Syria, Syrian Assad’s, 
[inaudible] in Turkish, I do not know in English how to say it. Assad blames 
Erdogan as behaving as a Sunni country or emphasised sector in Islam. This is 
not classical Turkish foreign policy, but if you behave with your sectarian 
approach you are in a Middle Eastern identity. But, for the European approach 
you must keep the citizenship or nation state identity. This has been a very big 
Earthquake for Turkish people and Turkish state problems and what’s the 
combination of it, according to me, I prefer the European Union but there is a 
real divergence in Turkish public opinion. I think Turkey keeps the 
moderation for Islamism and for Europeanism.  
 
Y: It’s a very contentious topic in the media though, would you say that the 
majority of Turkey would like to be part of the EU or not? 
 
I: Unfortunately, the EU’s behaviour broke the approach from Turkish public 
opinion because ten or fifteen years ago in opinion polls we have seen 75% 
support Turkey’s membership to the European Union, but today you can see 
some outcomes in opinion polls in Turkey that are only 25%. This does not 
mean a cultural approach. Turkey cannot trust, or Turkish public opinion 
cannot trust the European Union, especially if we remember Sarkozy’s 
approach, or Merkel’s situation or approach which broke the supporting 
Turkish public opinion for the European Union but in the future the conditions 
can change and I hope for this. Turkey is not, for instance, a classical Middle 
Eastern country because Turkey is approximately a democracy but some 
journalists have said it’s a hybrid democracy, but officially Turkey is a 
democracy and Turkey has a market economy and Turkey’s main founder and 
	   116	  
principles from Ataturk is a secular state, so, I am not pessimistic but being an 
optimist provides some conditions. That is a very political answer but I cannot 
estimate honestly. 
 
Y: Would you attribute the breakdown in relations more so to this divergence in 
identity and move towards the Middle East or to incidents from 2009 like 
Operation Cast Lead and the Mavi Marmara? 
 
I:  I think the AKP manipulated public opinion about Gaza operation because the 
same ruling party did not behave. you can remember in 2006 during the 
second Lebanon war, Hezbollah, Israel war, there was no crisis between 
Turkey and Israel. So I think that we cannot structurally shift from the 
protestant approach or Turkey’s main secular approach. But it was 
manipulated by the AKP, but this manipulation is very interesting because the 
United States’ political investment to the AKP is very interesting because this 
hegemony, the regional hegemony, could be a barrier for the United States in 
the long term because we know many leaders were supported by the United 
States and they have clashed with the United States. Not today, because there 
is a problem between… Turkey is a very interesting country, a single party 
government. You can say this, but this is not true because there is a problem 
between Erdogan and [inaudible]. This community, there is a very big political 
clash and they cannot share bureaucracy or judiciary and I think that 
sometimes, for instance I can give an example, [inaudible] condemned the 
AKP about the Mavi Marmara. He has said that it was a very wrong behaviour 
towards Israel, and his supporters in [inaudible] have stated that there can be 
some [inaudible] process. If secular or leftist column writers or politicians had 
blamed the AKP like this, the AKP could claim you support or you’ve served 
Israel but supporters criticised the AKP government, and it was a surprise to 
me. Sometimes in Turkey there are many [inaudible] from the United States 
and who is the real representative for the United States in Turkey 
Government? If you ask me, I think the United States can work with anybody. 
They’re a very pragmatic country, that’s not a problem, but this representation 
of Turkey is very interesting because they gained power. 
 
Y:  So do you think the AKP thinks it no longer needs Israel or do you think the 
relationship is important and will go back to how it was before 2006? 
 
I:  I think there will be a reformation process between Turkey and Israel, or the 
Turkish-Israel relations because the United States needs it.  The United States 
does not prefer a broken relationship between Turkey and Israel, but it is not 
very easy. First of all, Turkey has some expectations from Israel, apologise, 
compensation and ending the blockade of the Gaza strip. Israel can do it or not 
it depends on the government, the Netanyahu government stays in until 
February 2013 then there will be an election, but in Israel, you know there can 
be no single party governments because the election system is very interesting. 
Two parties, three parties, four parties, and marginal parties can determine 
Israel’s main policy, or Israel’s foreign policy. For instance we know of 
Lieberman, but Lieberman is only a symbol of many marginal parties in Israel. 
I think this problem is not only about Turkey, in both of the countries there is 
a real conservatism, but this conservatism is not like European conservatism. 
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How can I say it… fundamentalism conservatism has produced a few terms 
for the Middle East. Why we can understand Turkish-Israel relationship, both 
of the so-called conservative governments determine the relationship in the 
short term, but in the long term, the big brother does. But for better relations, 
the United States supports it, because the United States’ real strategic partner 
of Israel, and the United states cannot give up on Israel or on Turkey. Why? It 
is very important. 
 
Y:  Do you think that Israel is important to Turkey ‘s state interests? 
 
I:  Sure, because Israel is an ally of the United States of America and also both of 
the countries have democracies, and both of the countries have market 
economies. For instance, Turkish-Israeli foreign trade portfolio is at about is 
$3.5 billion and it would be better, and Israel especially works on high 
technology. Turkey has many interests from Israel. Also to influence the 
Middle East, in foreign policy issues, but we know the Middle East’s main 
approach to Israel, there is a strong condemnation of Israel. But in spite of it, 
Turkish-Israel relationship must be progressed. Because Turkey is a member 
of the Western system and also Israel’s administration we know that 
modernity and other [inaudible] has many interests in Turkey, and also Israel, 
because Israel is very lonely in the Middle East and Israel needs Turkey’s 
main non-violent approach to the Middle East and so this relationship must be 
progressed. But, politicians are the main barriers, because there are many Jews 
in Turkey. Also today, approximately I think there are 30,000 Jews who live 
in Turkey, especially in the economy which they are attracted to. Also Jews in 
Turkey are fond of Turkish nationalism. Do you know [inaudible] He is one of 
the founders of Turkish nationalism. So I think in the last years or last quarter 
you can say, from the 1960’s, especially Arab approaches and Islamic 
approaches influenced Turkish public opinion. 
 
Y:  Lastly, how long do you think until Israeli-Turkish relations are restored? 
 
I:  Estimations are difficult, first of all you must see the 2013 elections in Israel. 
In Turkey there are many elections. For instance, in 2014 local elections, in 
2015 parliamentary elections, and also in 2014, the Presidency elections. But 
we do not know yet the presidency systems presidency elections or 
parliamentary systems presidency elections. We must wait until 2015. 
 
Y:  So you think it will take a change of government for relations to return to how 
they were? 
 
I:  I think, I can be wrong, but I think AKP government will sustain in the new 
elections, this is the reality. But I think governments can be pragmatic. Also in 
Israel, Netanyahu’s situation, I do not think that Netanyahu will lose these 
next election because it was  a surprise for me that the Kadima party 
integrated into the coalition government, but Kadima was a real alternative for 
the Netanyahu government, but I do not know,  they must have preferred to 
integrate the government. So I think the main administrations or main 
governments will sustain if there is no surprise and there are normal 
conditions. But this so-called conservative government changed approach to 
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each other in conjunction because in the Middle East we will see many 
changes in Syria and Iraq. In Iraq and the Middle East, I think the real issue is 
Kurdistan because Kurdistan is being founded in northern Iraq, for instance, 
and it would be a real progress country its another Arab country right and its 
important. Israel has many political and economic investments in the 
Kurdistan region and also Turkey. So, besides the Syrian approach for Turkish 
relationship, for instance, one more common approach is of the Kurdistan 
regional government. Also Israel’s effort and Israel’s approach to Azerbaijan. 
Israel’s-Azerbaijan relations are very interesting because Israel’s has many 
economic investments and political investments. For instance, 
telecommunication system, medical system in general belongs to Israel is 
Azerbaijan. I think this relationship is very important because there will be 
more common points for a Turkish-Israeli relationship.   
 
Y:  One last thing. Why do you think Israel refuses to apologise for the Mavi 
Marmara? 
 
I:  I think it’s about the current domestic policies. The Netanyahu government 
thinks that if he apologises to Turkey then…well, it’s about the elections. For 
pragmatism we can say that in February 2013, after the Israeli federal 
elections that there could be an apology, but this is only an estimation and I 
could be wrong. Also, Erdogan’s behaviour towards Israel could change. 
Politics is not sustainable in terms of hostility and friendship. 
 
Y: Thank you so much for your time Mr. Taniz 
 
Interview terminated 17:50 
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Appendix C3:  
Transcript: Tuncay Kardas Interview, 7th July 2012 
 
Location: Istanbul, Turkey 
Date: 07/07/12 
Interviewer: Katherine Cook (Y) 
Interviewee: Tuncay Kardas (I) 
 
Interview commenced 16:00 
 
Y:  How would you describe the current relationship between Turkey and Israel?  
 
I:  I think it’s really bad in terms of not just the diplomacy level but also the 
social and political fields, if you like. International relations is never simply 
just international relations its also how people connect, react and in the media 
age, you can’t just escape from events like that. If you know the Marmara 
incident, if this event had happened say ten or fifteen years ago, I think no one 
would have noticed it for two reasons. First, people would not be aware of it 
because this one you know was televised, live. I was awake; it was in the early 
hours of the morning because the day before, I knew that thing were going to 
go wrong and unfortunately it happened in that way. The second reason, 
government would have turned a blind eye to it, had it happened say fifteen 
years ago because it’s never an easy topic to deal with, Israel and in front of 
the live audience, international and national and I would say even this 
government would have turned a blind eye had it happened years ago. But 
now, it was never able tot urn a blind eye to it because of the media coverage 
and second the runner up process to the event was built in international scenes 
in such a hyped mediatic way and so they cornered themselves into an abyss. 
If you look at it from this perspective, things were…I mean it was obvious 
from the start that things were really badly going to go wrong but there were 
also some structural reasons to it like as I said, the position of the media, the 
early discourses of the government on the topic. When I say early discourses I 
mean the processes like Davos’ speech of Erdogan three or four years ago. 
The Gaza Operation of Israel in 2006. All of these built up to such a huge 
reaction from Turkey. I’ve been living in this country for the rest of my life 
except for six years when I did my PhD in Britain, but I have never seen a 
reaction of this sort. It was huge, it exploded and it’s interesting to me. 
 
Y: Do you think the AKP meant for this reaction? That they paved the way for 
this? 
 
I: My hunch is that no, at least not to that level. This foreign minister is a clever 
guy and he knows what he’s speaking and what he’s doing. He’s a very good 
strategist. He used to be my professor, I know him in person and my hunch is 
that it’s not what it meant to be. They wanted to have, I guess, an escalation, 
but they never guessed that Israel would react so harshly. So my answer is no, 
they didn’t envisage such a huge reaction 
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Y:  Would you say that Turkish-Israeli relations have continuously spiraled since 
2003? 
 
I: I don’t think so. I think Israel was always an easy target for Islamists in the 
country and it’s like a pet target really. Islamists of Turkey are always 
conscious and complaining about Israel’s acts in the past and even in our time. 
But it was, at least in the initial fazes of the AKP government, it was not 
something they wanted to have…trouble. Initially they had this problem of 
legitimacy in the eyes of international and national cover centres so it was 
simply unthinkable to have a fallout of this sort with Israel in 2003 because 
they already had this headache of Iraq with American intervention and Turkey 
didn’t know whether or not to get involved. The Prime Minister wanted to get 
involved and act with the US but my hunch is that many members of his party 
and the Turkish public did not. So, initially, no. 
 
Y: What would you attribute the breakdown to specifically, which events? 
 
I: If you have a chance to have a look at the article I gave you, we tried to 
explain the breakdown to the discursive level of securitisation. I think that 
securitisation was a very big factor in the building of relations in the 90s. 
When you have the chance to speak out you can reverse the situation by 
speaking in different terms, non-security terms. When Islamists of this country 
had the chance to speak out against powers of the establishment in the military 
they had the chance to reconfigure and re represent this situation to the public 
in such a way that they sort of stole the show from the military. They were 
able to do this. In the 90s it was the military who stole the show by invading 
the stages of televisions, I assume you are familiar with this. It was very much 
publicised as well in the 90s so it was mostly something that agreed, not in an 
agreements, but the representation of that agreement in the 90s and re-
representation of this agreement in the 2000s would give you a sense that 
things happen in this country, in the last twenty years, much thanks to the 
discursive interaction and in fighting, so it’s effective. I would boil it down to 
the factors at the level of civil and military relations but also the effect of the 
inclusion of different societal influences, such as the Islamists, like right 
winged television stations. These lobbying groups were really effective in 
reversing what has happened and in re-representing what is going on and 
especially in 2006 when again people were reacting to the events in Gaza, 
Operation Lead, afterwards. All of these gave the sense to the Turkish people 
that Turkey, as it stands, powerful, increasingly powerful, should react to this 
and obviously officials did tap into this new avenue. It was only natural…if 
you are a politician you know that this wave is coming from the deep levels of 
civil society for you to do something against the values you have help dearly, 
for such a long time, then it was only normal and natural to see that happen. 
 
Y: Do you think the identity of Turkey has changed and that this has played any 
role? Do you see Turkey as identifying itself more with the Middle East now 
that Europe?    
 
I: Martina Warning and I were saying that this is another very popular topic to 
talk about in international media and I think that one should be really careful 
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not to overstate and over emphasise the role of the changing identity, to the 
extent that when people with strong identities come into power today or 
tomorrow in one way or another they would like to showcase their identity in 
different manners in international politics and national politics. One reason is 
this identity orientation, but I would say my reservation and dislike of this 
identity argument is that they treat identities as so strong and already built and 
materialised an already there and not in any way getting shaped. No, identities 
are in the process of getting shaped every time and in every occasion. Not 
every day, obviously, but different occasions do build identities. I would say 
that yes it has an effect but you should not over emphasise its effect because 
it’s subtle and the same Turkey with the same identity would react to the 
events with Israel through the Mavi Marmara or Gaza or general Palestinian 
question, but the same Turkey would not react to events in another place with 
the similar sort of identity dynamics. This gives me the reason to reconsider 
my assumptions about how identities come to effect, and I know this is very 
theoretical, it’s not easy to grasp initially. My dislike of this identity argument 
is that you can’t treat people like cultural dopes, they are not stupids, they are 
not like row boats, they obviously have an identity but with this identity comes 
different material and different calculations, rational reactions and so they 
would go so far as to issue a warning to Israel or to the breakdown of relations 
but this would not lead to the breakdown in relations with the US. Even 
though you know deep down that it’s the US that gives the green light to so 
many things that Israel does. You see my point? You are saying yes to the 
United States and their foreign policy. Obviously you have problems with 
them too, but, at the end of the day you know your limits, everything. But, 
with Israel, you step up your ideas and your reactions in such ways that cater 
to the internal public but also to the Arab audience. I assume you are familiar 
with the latest events and when the AKP reacts to Israel it is not just because 
of identity reasons but also out of a strategic calculation, which is in built with 
identity, yes, no question, but also mixed with other seriously material, 
strategic calculations. So it is a mixture, a clever mixture. It’s not a mash up, 
not a hot pot, it’s a clever this amount of identity, but this amount of 
realpolitik as well. They would say I’m reacting to Israel, maybe one of the 
strongest reactions, but don’t forget, this reaction is not meant to come from 
my internal Muslim identity, no. There is a growing Arab market, not simply a 
material market, but a belief market so Pandora’s box is open and everything 
is out to offer. You can’t just say here is my own vision, my own strategy for 
the Middle East. This was a signal to the Arab audience, the internal audience, 
plus to the internal old guard, military, saying that I have the upper hand now. 
With one stone, you can kill so many birds. It was not a headless, irrational act 
of identity. 
 
Y: Would you agree that the AKP, under Erdogan’s leadership, has had an 
agenda to disengage its alliance with Israel in order to further its Muslim 
identity or hegemony in the Middle East? 
I: The AKP would love to see the Palestinian problem come to an end so the 
AKP to my reading would not have any trouble with Israel signing a peace 
agreement with Palestine, on equal terms. It would not disagree necessarily 
with Israel, even if Eastern Jerusalem is now the Capital of the new Palestinian 
state. It is ready to concede so many things to Israel, but on the condition that 
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Israel would behave, that it would come to acceptable borders of international 
law and it would not behave like a bully. Yes, it wants to build its own 
hegemony, if you like, but this does not mean that it would go into a conflict 
head on with Israel. It doesn’t want that, obviously. It would try to establish a 
hub; a network of friendly states but this isn’t as strong as some seem to argue. 
It’s not a united front of Muslim states or anything like that. Gulf states have a 
lot of money, they invest a lot and in Turkey, different parts of Turkey. 
Turkey’s economy is increasingly dependent on this so it’s hegemony but 
deep down the economic motives play a huge role, but they are never 
articulated simply in economic terms, they would be articulated in identity 
terms and maybe in a discourse which would resemble old Ottoman bravado 
or something like that. IT doesn’t mean that Turkey would try to build its 
hegemony no matter what. 
 
Y: Do you think that possibly Israel feels threatened by this and that’s why they 
refuse to apologise over the Flotilla incident? 
 
I: Yes, it might be. 
 
Y: If they were to apologise, do you think that relations would return to how they 
were? 
 
I: It would not return to normal. I think it’s a little too late for getting back to 
normal, but it would be a good way to come to a reasonable level where both 
sides to the conflict would realise that their interest is not in perpetrating this 
conflict, but going back to normal would take years because it is so fresh in 
the minds of so many. These people who were killed, it was in front of the 
eyes of the people and this is what makes it so dramatic and so difficult for 
governments to bounce back because its going to lose faith from so many 
different fronts like I mentioned earlier, such as the Arab front, the domestic 
front and internal power centres because the military was the primary actor 
who initiated the strategic alliance with Israel out of the blue. It is difficult to 
go back to normal but it’s never impossible to get to the level where sides 
would be like okay neighbours.  
 
Y: Do you think the relationship is important? 
 
I: Yes, of course it is important. A peace without Israel is not in sight and I don’t 
think you can react to the Palestinian conflict in any terms that would give the 
hopes of a Jew free Middle East. There are some Mavericks who would, anti-
Zionists like Ahmadinejad or the clique around him but I think the Turkish 
foreign policy making style is no Iranian style so I don’t think they would bare 
the burden of simply dismissing Israel out of hand. Israel is a strong state, an 
important state, not to mention its connections with the United States and not 
to mention the Saudi factor, which doesn’t want radicals to rule in the Middle 
East. It’s obvious for observers that Turkey would see Israel as an important 
state in the Middle East. 
 
Y: Do you think Turkey needs Israel more than Israel needs Turkey? 
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I: Not any more. In the 90s, well even in the 90s this would be difficult to 
suggest, but let’s assume that because of the internal power game, the 
domestic power struggle, let’s assume that so many different power centres in 
Turkey needed Israel’s help. Not necessarily state help but lobbying help, not 
simply lobbying against the Armenian issue in the United States but Israel has 
had a strong presence in so many different countries through so many different 
methods of power. Ideological power, economic power, you are familiar with 
this, so in the past, when Turkey’s economy was weak and when Turkey 
needed strongly to buy new weapons for itself and when it was dependent on 
the US in the 90s, but less so now because of predictable reasons, like the 
economy growing at an incredible 6% rate. Basic economics never disappoint 
harshly the people of Turkey. So, in this way, power strands give Turkey the 
feeling that Israel should apologise and never forget that Turkey has, the 
government has, with the help of a civil society organisation, i.e. the Gülen 
Movement, perhaps you are not familiar with this, it is a religious movement 
in Turkey, a strong religious missionary. They are strong. They have some 
problems now with the government but they are strong, they are the architects 
of so many new things in Turkey. Anyway, despite drawbacks with the 
government, they along with the government managed to reach power in the 
judiciary. They have prosecutors, judges, which are not a member of this 
clandestine, secret organisation but sort of sympathising with us. They have a 
strong presence in judiciary and in the government itself. It is also very much 
against the power of the military so in today’s world who do you need? 
Military is siding with you, civil society is siding with you and international 
environments are also not hostile, as it used to be. So, Turkey would say it’s 
Israel who should apologise.  
 
Y: Do you think that the Muslim identity of Turkey is affecting its plight to join 
the EU? Do you believe the AKP still wants to be part of the EU? 
 
I: What do you think? Do you think Turkey’s Muslim identity is an obstacle to 
joining any Western organisation? 
 
Y: No, personally I think that if Erdogan was offered a place in the EU he would 
take it but the media that we receive at home says this is not the case, we are 
told that Turkey doesn’t want or need the EU. 
 
I: Yes, I think it would be wrong to think that Turkey has turned its back. It’s the 
other way around actually. It’s the German and French governments who are 
strongly opposed. The good old Sarkozy never wanted Turkish membership so 
they are doing their best to put obstacles which went right in the early 2000s. I 
don’t think Muslim identity is a big, huge challenge. The importance of this 
theory of securitisation once again is apparent and it’s the European media 
centres and obviously right winged governments that capitalise on economic 
difficulties and hardships and re-represent Turkish membership as security and 
they are quite good at it. I don’t know if you’re familiar with it but I’m going 
to present a paper on it in Manchester, precisely on this topic, talking about 
how visual re-representation of the Muslim identity if contributing to the 
establishment of negative public reactions. Print and visual media plays a huge 
part in misrepresenting what is at stake in the membership with Turkey. Look 
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at the cartoon crisis, Prophet Mohammed cartoon crisis, six years ago in 
Denmark. It was a huge blow to any positive images of a Muslim and 
obviously the minarets referendum in Switzerland which was again three years 
ago. There were huge banners in the public places of Switzerland. Showing 
the pictures of a minaret as a missile, so this is visual securitisation. There are 
plenty of such examples and obviously if you are a politician, especially if you 
are a right winged politician, you would capitalise on such a receptive, already 
built in identity, so I don’t see any natural conflict between Turkish or 
European sides. All are artificially built and artificially there. 
 
Y: Do you think that Turkey would accept and invitation to join the EU if it were 
asked today? 
 
I: Yes, of course, no question about it. These are overly exaggerated, those news 
coverage that you have just mentioned, saying that Turkey doesn’t want that, 
Turkey does everything in its power, almost everything, except a few things 
such as the new penal code which has caused so many journalists and so on to 
go to jail but I don’t think it’s a huge blow to the Turkish freedom of speech, 
freedom of expression. Obviously, it is a drawback, I would not deny that, but 
it’s not as serious as some seem to imply. Give the green light that Turkey 
would be a member and overnight Turkey would change its penal codes. It’s a 
little bit of a give and take issue. Disappointment would obviously, naturally 
slow down your reform process. Reluctance from the EU side is what I mean. 
The Turkish side would say what have you given me, nothing, so why should I 
be overly giving in return? No big deal in Turkish reactions to the EU. 
 
Y: How long do you think until Turkey and Israel return to past relations?  
 
I: What is your guess? 
 
Y: Until a change of government on both sides perhaps. 
 
I: Okay, what kind of government change do you think would give the green 
light? 
 
Y: I don’t think the Israeli government wants to be seen as weak and they feel, in 
realist terms, that if they succumb to Turkish demands and apologise, they’ll 
be seen as weak and lose the next elections. Perhaps not even a change in 
government but after their next election, that could spar an apology. 
 
I: So you think a change in government in Israel. I definitely agree with that. The 
onus is on the Israeli side now. A less right winged, less chauvinistic 
government would definitely, I’m sure, contribute to the betterment of the 
relationship either by apologising or maybe even a rough apology would do. I 
don’t think Turkey would stick to it’s early harsh, ‘no, no’ position. As you 
say, it takes a government to change. 
 
Y: Or perhaps just a change in the media. 
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I: Yes, that’s true and I have to say that people generally do not see how this 
new vision, re-order of thinking of the people inside. People are now more 
self-confident more assertive, so it’s very difficult for the government, the 
Turkish government, to back down from it’s initial positions, so it would be 
disastrous for it to bounce back because this is how you have built your own 
image, inside and outside. It is because of this reason that it’s also difficult for 
Turkey to act like nothing has happened and to withdraw its demand for an 
apology. No, it’s difficult. Think about the difficult situation the US finds 
itself in in the Middle East. It’s in huge trouble, look Pakistan, look at 
Afghanistan, look at Iraq. It does need Turkey, more than it needs Israel. This 
is the trick which Israel does not see. It assumes that no matter what, good old 
US support would continue forever. No, the US needs Turkey, even if that 
Turkey is a pompous Turkey. Increasingly it’s acting like a child saying it 
wants this and that. Even in this, the US would need Turkey’s help, where? In 
Iraq. A militarily assertive Turkey would be of great help to the US in the Iraqi 
war front, in Afghanistan, in putting order in the Middle Eastern, huge, new 
chaotic situation. You do need the domestic political experiences of Turkey 
when it comes to establishing a new regime in Egypt, for instance. Look at 
Egypt, the new Muslim brotherhood government looks in the eyes of Turkey, 
they are very much drawn to Turkey, they would not necessarily disagree with 
Turkey. Syria is a different case, there is the Russian factor and Chinese 
support which is a different story. Egypt is very difficult; it is very difficult to 
convince Muslim brothers if you are Russia, if you are not nationalist, if you 
are secularist and if you are a Christian country. I don’t like this term, Joseph 
Nye used it, ‘soft power’, but since everyone uses it I use it reluctantly. I 
would say that Turkey’s soft power portfolio is way stronger than any state’s 
in the Middle East. You know, Tunisia, Egypt and now Syria, when you look 
at this and given the incredible successful economic parameters, it’s very 
difficult to see Turkey stepping down or bouncing back in the near future. Of 
course, you should never say never. One more thing though which would 
bring down this new vision of foreign policy in Turkey, either be it towards 
Israel or in any part, would be, I think, a war with Syria or a high level 
casualty resulting from a military incursion in either Iraq or Syria. No matter 
what is the position of Israel on this, a war would be disastrous for new 
Turkish foreign policy. I would say the government is very careful not to 
escalate this situation to a war type confrontation. They are very careful and 
obviously they do say some harsh words, exchanging threats maybe even, but 
I think it would be extremely difficult for Turkey to regain once it loses its 
face in the Middle East and in internal politics and so on and so forth. This is 
why, like so many provocations, the government holds itself from reacting too 
much to the downing of this Turkish jet in Syria. As I said, I assume one of the 
downfalls of the new Turkish foreign policy and government, one of them 
would be a war or a strong military adventure, if you like, in Iraq or in any 
place. I’m sure you are familiar with the latest peace initiative of the 
government, the AKP with the Kurdish rebels, the newest one. It seems that 
they are this time quite serious to sit down and discuss and negotiate a peace 
plan for both sides and I think why? Why now? The reason is, I think, is the 
international environment is very receptive to this peace plan as well. The US 
wants it, the US wants stronger presents of Turkey in Iraq because it wants to 
have a state which is roughly in its control. Obviously, I say this is mutual, but 
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of which would be replacing, in the mid term, the face of the US in Iraq or in 
Afghanistan and so they are pushing the Kurdish rebels to come to the table as 
well. 
 
Y: Thank you for your time Mr. Kardas 
 
Interview terminated 16:55 
